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Abstract
We examine the effects of a novel political institution called Coalition Preclusion Contracts
(CPCs) on the functioning of parliamentary democracies with proportional representation.
CPCs enable political parties to credibly exclude one or several parties from the range of
government coalitions they are prepared to envisage after elections. We consider a simple
political game with a two-dimensional policy space in which three parties compete to form
the government. We find that CPCs with a one-party exclusion rule defend the interests of
the majority by precluding coalition governments that would include so-called extreme parties.
This translates into moderation of the policies implemented and yields welfare gains for a large
set of parameter values. We discuss the robustness of the results in more general settings and
study how party-exclusion rules have to be adjusted when more than three parties compete in
an election.
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“How many times do I have to repeat myself, Mr. Markwort? You will not receive any
other answer tonight than the one I have given over during the past weeks and months.
There will be no cooperation whatsoever with the [party] Die Linke [the Left].” (Andrea
Ypsilanti, SPD, 2008)1
1 Introduction
Motivation
In parliamentary democracies with proportional representation, coalition formation is essential for
government since one single party rarely obtains an outright majority of seats in parliament. On
occasion, government coalitions are made up of conventional parties plus small parties perceived
by a large majority of voters to be extremist and undesirable.2 Governments that include so-called
extreme parties have formed in several European countries in the last few decades, as shown next:3
Austria Belgium Denmark Estonia Finland France Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland
1 2 0 (2) 5 13 7 2 5 7 2
Italy Luxembourg Norway Poland Portugal Slovakia Slovenia Sweden Turkey
9 (1) 1 2 11 (1) 4 2 1 0 (1) 2
Table 1: Number of European governments with an extreme party in the period 1945-2012 (in
parentheses, number of instances where an extreme party acted in support of a government in the
scope of parliamentary procedures).
While in political campaigns prior to an election conventional parties usually try to persuade voters
that they will not form certain coalition governments—particularly with extreme parties—, they do
not always stick to that promise. A case in point is illustrated by the above quote from Andrea
Ypsilanti, who after the election in Hesse in 2008 was prepared to go back on her pledge. Such
a breach of promise may not only be undesirable in itself, but it may also affect welfare as a
government coalition with extreme parties could eventually lead to policies that do not square with
1Andrea Ypsilanti was the SPD candidate for the position of minister-president (Ministerpra¨sident) in the state
elections in Hesse, Germany, in 2008. The quote has been retrieved at http://www.focus.de/magazin/tagebuch/
tagebuch-schauspielerin-ypsilanti_aid_263564.html, on 6 March 2013.
2Using data from Austria, Plescia and Aichholzer (2017) find that the evaluation of two-party coalitions is dispro-
portionally affected by the evaluation of their junior member. This is consistent with findings in the literature—see
references therein. According to this observation, coalitions whose junior member is an extreme party—which is itself
rated very poorly by a majority of citizens—will be found to be among the most undesirable government coalitions.
3Source: Database “Elections, Parties, Governments” of the Research unit “Democracy: Structures, Performance,
Challenges” as part of the research area “Civil Society, Conflicts, and Democracy” at the Social Science Research
Center Berlin (WZB). A party is considered a government party if members of this party served as ministers in a
certain space of time during a legislative period. A party is considered extreme if it is coded as communist or nationalist
in the Manifesto Research of Political Representation (MARPOR). European countries that are not included in the
table did not have governments in which extreme parties participated.
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the preferences of a large majority of voters.
Whether a party sticks to such promises or not largely depends on the trade-off between the rep-
utation costs of breaking an electoral promise and the expected benefits of forming a government.
In current parliamentary democracies, both possibilities are attractive at times for political parties
because promises regarding government formation can only be based on a party’s or a candidate’s
reputation, a variable that differs greatly across cases. Against this background, what would be the
consequences for government formation and the policies implemented if, before the election, parties
could bindingly commit not to form a government with a particular set of parties? Would welfare
be improved? These are the central questions this paper poses.
To address these questions, we examine a novel political institution that we call Coalition Preclusion
Contracts (henceforth simply CPCs). They represent a new type of political contract, as surveyed
in Gersbach (2012). In a CPC, a party specifies a list of parties that it commits itself not to form
a government coalition with after the next elections. If the party violates the CPC, i.e. if it forms
a government with a party listed in the contract, the party is severely punished. For instance,
it may not be allowed to nominate candidates for cabinet positions, or its public funding may be
considerably reduced.4 We assume that violations of CPCs are punished so gravely that they will
never be infringed, making such political contracts an effective commitment tool.
Model and results
For both the analysis of the conditions under which CPCs will be written and the assessment of the
welfare implications of such contracts, we consider a simple political game in which three parties
compete first for votes in an election and second to form the government after the elections. For
simplicity, we also assume that there are three voters, each leaning towards one party.5 We focus
on the interesting case where voter and party preferences are such that in the absence of CPCs,
coalitions between a conventional party and the extreme party will occur.
Two of the parties are conventional, in the sense that they have platforms on the left and right
with regard to political issues such as tax policy and public-good provision, with the corresponding
conventional voters having more moderate positions than the parties in such policy dimension. The
remaining party is extreme, because its defining characteristic is that it advocates a substantial policy
change in a second policy dimension orthogonal to the conventional policy dimension mentioned
earlier.6 Examples of such a policy change would be leaving NATO or a monetary/political union,
4A punishment should also apply to a party attempting to form a minority government by counting on the votes
of parties excluded in the contract. We refer to Section 6.2 for an in-depth discussion of the legal aspects related to
the practical implementation of CPCs.
5This suffices to capture the situation where under sincere voting, the set of all minimal coalitions coincides with
the set of two-party coalitions. Only in such cases is the analysis of CPCs interesting.
6The extreme party could more generally be interpreted as a special interest party. Such a party should addition-
ally have a bad label, making it impossible for the majority of citizens to vote for it under any circumstances.
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closing the borders to immigrants, or nationalizing the banking system. Such a shift away from
the status quo in the second policy dimension is desired only by a minority of voters, who are
represented by the remaining voter—called the extreme voter. Such a voter feels strongly about
the policy change advocated by the extreme party and will always vote for it. In the first policy
dimension, the extreme party has moderate preferences.
As for the two conventional voters, they will never vote for the extreme party but they may coordinate
their votes on one of the conventional parties. These conventional voters do not support the shift in
the second policy dimension and would prefer a grand coalition of the two conventional parties over
a coalition government formed by one conventional party and the extreme party, if the latter were
able to impose such policy shift in the coalition agreement.7 Conventional parties do not support
the policy shift either but are tempted to engage in coalitions with the extreme party as the latter is
willing to offer substantial perks—and even relinquish its preferred policy in the conventional policy
dimension—in return for the implementation of such a policy change. Even though conventional
parties may have an incentive to attract more voters by ruling out a coalition with the extreme party
before the election, they may be tempted to break their promises after the election if they cannot
form a single-party government and thus require a coalition partner.8
Our main insights from the model are as follows: First, voters will vote sincerely in the situation
without CPCs, leading to a coalition government between a conventional party and the extreme
party. Such a government will implement the policy shift in the second policy dimension, while
choosing a moderate policy in the first dimension. This outcome follows from the extreme party’s
strong bargaining position when negotiating a coalition agreement with either conventional party,
which induces it to renounce perks but not its moderate position in the conventional policy dimen-
sion.9
Second, when CPCs are introduced, whether the conventional parties will exclude the extreme party
from a government coalition or not will depend crucially on the expected probability of conventional
voters coordinating their votes on the party that ruled out the extreme party—assuming that only
one conventional party has done so. If such exclusion is made by one conventional party, coordination
7A “grand coalition” between the two conventional parties has the same number of votes as a coalition between
either of them and the extreme party. Typically, the vote share for extreme parties is less than that of the large
conventional parties, as implied in our reference to a coalition between both conventional parties as the “grand
coalition”.
8A noteworthy attempt to make campaign promises regarding coalition partners credible occurred in Catalonia,
Spain, in the regional elections that took place in 2006. Prior to the elections, CiU stated in a document signed
before a notary that it would not establish any agreement with PP—the document can be found (in Catalan) at
http://www.ciu.cat/media/9890.pdf (the information was retrieved on 26 February 2014). While such a move may
have helped CiU in the political campaign, it was very unclear whether it was legally binding, and hence it lacked
the credibility potential of CPCs. CiU stands for Converge`ncia i Unio´, PP stands for Partido Popular.
9This power originates in part on the fact that the extreme party’s position in the conventional policy is moderate,
i.e. in the center of the two conventional parties’ position. This provides the extreme party with similar leverage in
the negotiations with either conventional party. In particular, it is crucial that such a moderate position is credible.
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between the two conventional voters will always follow to avoid that each party receives one vote,
in which case the only feasible government coalition between the extreme party and a conventional
party would form and implement a policy that is non-moderate in both policy dimensions. We shall
characterize the equilibria depending on the aforementioned probability. It turns out that both
conventional parties will exclude the extreme party if this probability is sufficiently large. In such
cases, a grand coalition will result, which will not carry out the shift in the second policy dimension
and will also choose a moderate policy in the first dimension. By contrast, no CPC will be written
when the coordination probability in favor of the only conventional party excluding the extreme
party is low.
Third, we find that with the possibility of writing CPCs another equilibrium may also occur, where
conventional parties exclude any coalition government whatsoever. As conventional voters will re-
act to the CPCs written by coordinating their votes on one conventional party, this will make a
single-party government inevitable. These additional equilibria are socially undesirable when party
preferences are polarized in the first policy dimension if citizens are sufficiently risk averse, but are
eliminated when each party can exclude at most one other party in its CPC (one-party exclusion
rule).
Fourth and last, with the one-party exclusion rule, the introduction of CPCs will involve welfare gains
for a large set of parameter values. These gains stem from the avoidance of an extreme policy shift
in the second policy dimension and from implementation of a moderate policy in the first dimension.
Moreover, the introduction of a law permitting CPCs will be supported at the constitutional level
by both conventional parties, the reason being that, with CPCs, conventional parties can eliminate
the risk of the other conventional party forming a government with the extreme party.
Organization of the paper, extensions, robustness
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we relate our work to the existing literature. In
Section 3 we present our simple model for elections in a parliamentary democracy. Then, in Sections
4 and 5 respectively, we consider two different rules specifying how CPCs have to be written and
characterize the set of equilibria in each case. In Section 6 we study the welfare implications of
CPCs in the light of the results from the previous sections and discuss the predicament posed by the
actual implementation of CPCs in a parliamentary democracy. Section 7 concludes. Additionally,
there is supplementary material consisting of several appendices. In Appendix A we discuss all the
model assumptions in detail. Appendix B contains all the proofs of the paper. Appendices C and
D are devoted to several extensions of the model, all of which add greatly to the robustness of our
results.
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2 Relation to the Literature
We consider a political game with underlying conflicts (i) between voters and parties with regard to
policies and (ii) between parties with regard to policies and coalitions. Our paper is thus related to
several strands of literature.
Coalition formation
The formation of coalitions is central to many real-world phenomena, including the arrangement
of governments, cartels, or bidding rings. Excellent comprehensive treatises on coalition formation
are provided by Cararro (2003) and Ray (2007). When focusing on political economy problems, in
particular, most models assume that offers for coalition formation are made sequentially (Selten,
1988; Chatterjee et al., 1993; Bandyopadhyay and Chatterjee, 2006).10 Our paper adds to this
literature by studying party incentives to preclude certain coalitions before they form.
Post-electoral coalitions in politics
In a multi-party system with proportional seat allocation, it is very common for parties to be unable
to form a government alone, so after the elections a coalition of parties emerges and takes over. Two
aspects of this phenomenon have come in for particular attention in the literature, (i) how parties
bargain in order to form a coalition government for an entire term, and (ii) how this information—
and other information regarding coalitions—is anticipated by the electorate.
The problem in (i) boils down to a bargaining situation among members with some opposing pref-
erences that have to decide about policies and perks (or cabinet positions). Our approach in this
paper is twofold. On the one hand, it involves the conventional parties as formateurs and the Nash
bargaining solution with bargaining power proportional to the share of seats in parliament as a bar-
gaining rule within the grand coalition (see Roemer et al., 2001). Hence, Gamson’s rule (Gamson,
1961) applies.11 On the other hand, we assume that the negotiations between a conventional party
and the extreme party do not adhere to such principle of proportionality, and are instead based
on the impossibility for the latter to compromise on its ideological stance. Ideology in the sense of
Benabou (2008) acts as a constraint for the mobility of such a party: accepting a policy that is far
away from its ideological stance would threaten its very existence.
With respect to (ii), voters are often assumed to estimate the formation probability for each coalition
and anticipate the policy compromises that will result (see e.g. Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988).
There is some empirical support for the view that voters are influenced by potential government
coalitions emerging after the elections. For instance, Blais et al. (2006) and Meffert and Gschwend
10There is empirical evidence that such models accurately reflect free-form bargaining (Bolton et al., 2003).
11For an empirical assessment of situations where the rule predicts the composition of governments, see Falco´-
Gimeno and Indridason (2013).
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(2010) show that voters are responsive to coalition signals. We assume that voters can completely
foresee the government formation process, in particular the effect that CPCs have on it.
Pre-electoral commitments
Without CPCs parties try other ways of making campaign promises credible. Aragone`s et al. (2007)
consider a model for repeated elections with completely informed and ideological voters and conclude
that, in equilibrium, the degree to which promises are credible increases with the reputation of
the candidate. Debus (2009) shows that pre-electoral (non-binding) announcements of possible
coalitions can influence the outcome of the government formation game. Golder (2006) shows that
the emergence of pre-electoral (binding) coalitions depends on institutional factors, as well as on
party platforms and history. CPCs offer a complementary way for parties to make credible promises
regarding government coalitions, which does not require forming one particular coalition before the
election but rather ruling one or several coalitions without the need to commit to one—and hence
CPCs enable a single-party government if electoral support turns out to be high enough. CPCs thus
work in situations in which reputation concerns are weak and campaign promises are cheap talk.
Moreover, they do not rely on punishment threats by voters.
3 A Simple Model of Elections
A Coalition Preclusion Contract (CPC) enables a party to credibly commit itself before an election
to forgoing a government coalition with any party specified in the contract.12 Will this possibility of
excluding another party from a coalition government be used by parties? How will such a possibility
affect welfare? To answer these questions, we analyze a simple model of political competition and
government formation in a parliamentary democracy with proportional representation. We initially
assume a one-party exclusion rule, i.e., parties can exclude no more than one other party. In
Section 5 we consider the case of CPCs in which an arbitrary number of parties can be excluded.
For our analysis, we make a series of assumptions regarding preferences and bargaining, the most
critical of which are discussed in the main text. Other assumptions do not affect the results, but
make exposition simpler. We refer to Appendix A for a full account of the rationale behind all
assumptions.
12We proceed on the assumption that the costs of violating CPCs are prohibitively high. If this were not the case,
when deciding whether to enter or not an excluded coalition, a party would compare the benefits of being in the
coalition to the associated costs. The party would then enter the precluded coalition if such costs were low enough.
In this case, CPCs would not be credible and the political game would be the same as without CPCs. This implies
that the benefits to parties associated with forming different coalitions set the threshold for the punishments that is
necessary for CPCs to be credible. If costs for violating CPCs allowed to credibly exclude some coalitions but not
others, the coalitions with the highest benefits could not be credibly excluded, and we would expect those to form
without CPCs. Hence, CPCs would have no bite in this case either. In sum, assuming prohibitively high costs for
violating CPCs enables us to focus on the interesting case where CPCs are credible.
7
3.1 Two political competition games
We analyze two games. First, we consider a game in which parties can write a CPC before the
elections and denote it by G+. Second, we consider a game in which parties can write no CPC and
denote it by G−. In both cases, we consider two conventional parties, L and R, an extreme party,
E, two conventional voters, l and r, and an extreme voter, e. Citizens each have one vote, which
they cast in the election. We assume that due to their ideological orientation e and E will not act
strategically : e will always vote for E, while E will only care about the implementation of a specific
policy. We also assume that conventional voters will only vote for conventional parties and that no
abstention will occur. Thus, N = {L,R, l, r} will effectively be the player set for both G− and G+.
We will henceforth denote a conventional party by K, with K ∈ {L,R}, and a conventional voter by
k, with k ∈ {l, r}. For notational convenience, we will also assume that k = r if and only if K = R,
and that {K, Kˆ} = {L,R} and {k, kˆ} = {l, r}. For simplicity, we assume no discounting.
3.2 The timeline of the games
We consider a political game that involves at most four main sequential stages:
Stage 1: Coalition Preclusion Contracts (if available),
Stage 2: Coordination Signal,
Stage 3: Elections,
Stage 4: Government Formation.
Game G−, which consists of Stages 2–4, describes current parliamentary democracies with propor-
tional representation. Game G+, which consists of Stages 1–4, describes the potential situation of
those democracies where CPCs could be written. We will now detail the different stages.
In Stage 2, before the election, all voters and parties will observe a public signal. This signal can be
of any kind, from a performance assessment of previous governments or polls in the media to personal
scandals involving politicians. The public signal may depend, in particular, on the parties’ contract
choices. As the signal will be publicly observed by all voters, it can be used by the conventional
voters to coordinate their votes on one of the conventional parties.
In Stage 3, each conventional voter will cast a vote for one conventional party. Subsequently, in
Stage 4, the government will be formed. If a conventional party has received two votes, it will form
the government and implement its preferred policy outright. If no party has obtained a majority,
coalitions will be formed following the lead of one of the conventional parties acting as a formateur.
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As a tie-breaking rule, with probability 1/2 either conventional party will be the formateur. The
extreme party, on the other hand, is indifferent between forming a coalition with one or the other
conventional party as long as they offer the same policies in government.13
We permit the non-formateur party to bargain with other parties before the negotiations conducted
by the formateur party are terminated.14 The possibility that government coalition proposals are
not strictly sequential undermines the bargaining power of the formateur party, which no longer has
a first-mover advantage.15 More specifically, we assume that once a formateur is determined, the
government formation process in the case where no party has the majority of votes will consist of
the following steps:
1. The formateur makes a proposal for a government coalition that has to honor the CPCs of all
parties involved (if any).
2. Upon observing the previous proposal, the non-formateur conventional party makes another
proposal for a government coalition that also has to honor the CPCs of all parties involved (if
any).16
3. Each party (R, L, and E) votes for one of the two government coalitions previously proposed,
at most. Abstention is allowed.
4. If a winning government coalition is agreed upon by all its members, a vote of confidence takes
place, and the coalition forms. In any other case, a caretaker government will be appointed.
We assume that negotiations between parties obey the following principles: First, the negotiations for
government formation between the two conventional parties are based on a proportionality principle,
i.e., the more seats, the more power. This assumption will ensure that the policy implemented by the
grand coalition is moderate in all policy dimensions—see below. Second, the negotiations between
a conventional party and the extreme party depend entirely on the latter’s bargaining power and
its wish to dictate a certain policy in exchange for renouncing perks and other policy interests. A
caretaker government consists of bureaucrats ensuring that operations in the executive branch go
on running, and it is the least preferred option for all voters and all parties.
13From a strategic viewpoint, E’s indifference is rational, and thus credible. The reason is that for the extreme
party, both coalitions with a conventional party will be symmetric outcomes and generate the same utility. The
identity of the formateur can then be used by the extreme party as a tie-breaking rule to decide which party it wants
to form a coalition with.
14This is a justified assumption, as simultaneous negotiations between parties often occur after elections and before
the government has been formed by the formal parliamentary procedure. A recent example of this off-parliament
bargaining occurred in the 2015 elections in Spain involving the Socialist Party (PSOE), Ciudadanos, and Podemos.
15In particular, the formateur party is no longer able to make small adjustments to the proposal the non-formateur
party would raise in a second stage in order to construct a proposal that will be implemented.
16The results of the paper would not change if we assumed that the two proposals are simultaneous and thus the
non-formateur cannot observe the first proposal.
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We will henceforth denote the set of possible policy outcomes by P = {pL, pR, pLR, pLE, pRE, pE, pct},
where the subscripts indicate the party or coalition in government and ct indicates a caretaker gov-
ernment. These policies are solutions to the bargaining problem that occurs at the government
formation stage. We say that E has strong bargaining power if it can form a coalition with both
conventional parties. We assume in this case that the same policy pE will be implemented by a
government coalition of either conventional party plus the extreme party. This reflects the assump-
tion that conventional parties are competing head-to-head for a coalition with E. When the latter
party can form a coalition government with only one conventional party, we say that it has weak
bargaining power. In such cases, policies will depend on the preferences of the conventional party
that can form a coalition with E, and thus pLE and pRE will differ.
It will turn out that the only relevant scenarios are those in which there are (at least) two policy
dimensions, conventional parties are more polarized than conventional voters, and the extreme party
is moderate in the dimension not defining its raison d’eˆtre. In particular, it will be useful to consider
that
P ⊆ T ×D.
We will interpret the policy space T ×D as consisting of (i) a first policy dimension, T ( R, which
represents a choice that can be varied continuously (e.g. a tax rate) and (ii) a second, binary policy
dimension D = {0, d¯} that represents an indivisible choice (e.g. membership of a monetary union).
We use d = 0 to denote the status quo in D and assume that
pK = (tK , 0), pKE = (tK , d¯), pk = (tk, 0), pLR = (tm, 0) , pE = (tm, d¯), and pe = (tm, d¯), (1)
where pk denotes k’s ideal policy, with k ∈ {l, r, e}. Figure 1 illustrates the ideal policies of parties
and voters.
pEpLE pRE
pl prpLRpL pR
T
D
Figure 1: A two-dimensional policy space and the voters’ preferred policies.
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3.3 The players’ utility profile
Voters and parties will derive utility from the policy p ∈ P implemented by the government. Party
K’s utility when policy p is implemented will be denoted by VK(p), and voter k’s utility will be
denoted by vk(p). Conventional parties will also derive utility from the perks associated with being
in government. The latter include all sources of utility beyond p for parties in power, such as exerting
power, ego rents, administrative or leadership position of party members, or public expenditures
targeted at the interest groups. Since some of these perks use public funds, they will lower the
voters’ utility. We specifically consider that a conventional party in both a single-party government
or in coalition with the extreme party will obtain additional utility B and that each conventional
party in a grand-coalition government will obtain additional utility b, where B > b > 0 and
2b ≥ B.17 (2)
We assume that the disutility created to voters by perks is the same regardless of the government
coalition and that only conventional parties will extract perks. The former assumption allows the
conventional voters’ decision to be guided by policy considerations only, the latter is justified when
both conventional parties are better connected to powerful groups than the extreme party or, as
we consider in the paper, when party E is only interested in implementing the extreme policy.18
Neither assumption is critical for our results, but they simplify the analysis. Given that P = T ×D
is two-dimensional and D is binary, we will also assume that in negotiations, party E is willing to
trade off perks (when possessing strong bargaining power in coalition formation) or perks and its
ideal policy in T (when possessing weak bargaining power). This captures the central importance
of party E’s defining policy issue, namely the policy shift in D. While in reality, such policy shifts
are not necessarily binary—or even discrete—and extreme parties might compromise on them, such
parties are severely limited in doing so in order not to jeopardize their very existence. Accordingly,
d¯ can be interpreted as the policy in D that is closest to the status quo among those that are
acceptable for party E, although it need not be its ideal policy in this dimension.19
17One prominent reason why a grand coalition involves higher perks than a single party government is the fiscal
commons problem, where the government budget represents a common pool for political decision-makers to target
resources from the public budget to projects that benefit the interest groups that support them. A greater number of
decision-makers tends to increase such wasteful government spending. Empirical support regarding this effect can be
found in e.g. Feld and Schaltegger (2009). A broader discussion of the public commons problem and coalition sizes
is provided in Gersbach and Schneider (2012).
18In Catalonia, Spain, the deal concluded in 2015 between CUP and Junts pel S´ı (Together for Yes) is a recent
instance of the phenomenon where a extreme party renounced all perks. CUP stands for Candidatura d’Unitat
Popular.
19A too extremist policy could never be accepted by the conventional voters, who would always find it profitable
to coordinate their votes on one conventional party. In such cases, party E would never be in government and CPCs
would not be necessary. For instance, while a conventional voter would never accept exiting a political union, he may
be willing to accept a referendum on the issue if this came with a moderate policy in T . The policy shift d¯ should be
understood in this case as the referendum itself and not as exiting the political unit. Potential examples are Brexit
or Catalan independence.
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In the next subsections, we will impose a number of assumptions on preferences that are precisely
designed to guarantee the following two conditions: (i) if CPCs are not available, the government
coalition will include party E, and (ii) CPCs might be written in equilibrium if they are available.
These assumptions focus our analysis on the circumstances where CPCs make a difference. When
such conditions are not met, either CPCs would be redundant or they would not be needed at all.
3.3.1 Party preferences
The conventional parties’ complete preferences over policy and perks before the election (i.e., ex-
ante) specify the following conditions:
VL(pL) +B > VL(pLE) +B > VL(pLR) + b > VL(pE) +
B
2
> VL(pR) > VL(pRE) > VL(pct), (3)
VR(pR) +B > VR(pRE) +B > VR(pLR) + b > VR(pE) +
B
2
> VR(pL) > VR(pLE) > VR(pct). (4)
In particular, after their most preferred alternative of an own single party government, conventional
parties rank a coalition with a “weak” extreme party higher than a grand coalition, which in turn
is ex-ante preferred to a coalition with a ”strong” extreme party. Focussing on the most interesting
assumption, we additionally consider that ex-post, i.e. after the election, any conventional party will
prefer to form a government with the extreme party, as the latter party will be able to offer higher
perks in return for implementing its desired policy shift. Specifically, we assume that
VK(pE) +B > VK(pLR) + b. (5)
The preference orderings specified in (3) and (4) greatly reduce the complexity of the analysis of
political games G− and G+.20 Indeed, under such assumptions—and under Condition (5)—, both
the government coalition formation and the policy implemented will follow directly from the CPCs
written and from the election outcome—as indicated below by Table 2—, with the formateur being
randomly chosen by nature in certain cases. This, in turn, will enable us to focus on the strategic
interactions between conventional parties and conventional voters that occur before Stage 4.
Under the one-party exclusion rule, a strategy σK for party K ∈ {L,R} will choose an element of
{L,R,E} \ {K}, and a strategy for voter k ∈ {l, r} will be a function that assigns an element of
{L,R} to each pair (σL, σR).21 A strategy profile will be denoted by σ = (σL, σR, σl, σr). We point
out that we are referring to game G+, game G− being simply the subgame of G+ that starts at the
node after (σL, σR) = (∅, ∅) has been chosen. Table 2 shows that CPCs will only affect the policy
implemented when each conventional party receives one vote in the election and no party can form
a government on its own. In such cases, CPCs helps selecting among pE, pRE, pLE, and pLR.
20If parties mainly care about the extent of the perks they can obtain when they are in power, the preference
orderings in (3) and (4) impose mild requirements on their policy preferences. We stress that our analysis encompasses
all intermediate cases with regard to the extent to which parties are office-oriented.
21To avoid cumbersome notation, we drop the dependency of voter strategies on the signal—see Section 3.4.
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(σK , σKˆ)
(σl, σr)
(R,R) (R,L) or (L,R) (L,L)
(∅, ∅)
pR (R)
pE (RE/LE)
pL (L)
(∅, {K})
({Kˆ}, {K})
(∅, {E})
pKE (KE)
({Kˆ}, {E})
({E}, {E}) pLR (LR)
Table 2: Policy implemented under the one-party exclusion rule and government coalition (in paren-
theses).
3.3.2 Voter preferences
To render party labels meaningful, we assume that conventional voters will rank at the top of their
preferences both the policy that the conventional party on the same side will implement and the
policy that the grand coalition will implement. That is,
vk(p) ≥ min {vk(pLR), vk(pK)} with p ∈ P =⇒ p ∈ {pLR, pK} . (6)
In particular, both these policies will be preferred to the policy that a government of a conventional
party plus the extreme party will implement when the latter has strong bargaining power, i.e.,
min {vk(pLR), vk(pK)} > vk(pE). (7)
There are nonetheless some crucial differences between conventional voters and parties on the same
political side. First, conventional voters will prefer the policy that the extreme party can impose
when it has strong bargaining power to the policy that a single-party government formed by the
conventional party on the other side will implement, i.e.,
vk(pE) > vk(pKˆ). (8)
Second, a conventional voter will prefer this latter policy to the one carried out by any coalition
made up of a conventional party and the extreme party when the latter has weak bargaining power,
i.e.,
vk(pKˆ) > max {vk(pKE), vk(pKˆE)} . (9)
Assumptions (8) and (9) are compatible if party preferences are polarized in T and D to a similar
degree. In turn, the conventional voters’ ideal policies in T must then be themselves polarized,
albeit significantly less than the platforms of their preferred parties. The latter is consistent with
findings of a large number of empirical studies—see Belchior (2012) and the literature discussion
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therein. If Assumptions (8) and (9) did not hold, there would be no room for negotiations between a
conventional party and the extreme party that could be accepted by the conventional voters, whether
with or without CPCs. Instead, conventional voters would always coordinate on one conventional
party and, in particular, either coalition governments with the extreme party would not form in the
absence of CPCs or such political contracts would be redundant if they were available.
3.4 Equilibrium concept
Before we explain our notion of equilibrium, we introduce some further notation. First, let Y :=
Y(σL, σR) denote the random variable that represents the signal of Stage 2. We allow parties to hold
different beliefs on the probability distribution induced by Y . We denote conventional party K’s
beliefs by SK := (SKL ,SKR ), with SKL = Pr(Y = L) and SKR = Pr(Y = R). It will be common
knowledge that the conventional parties’ priors are given by SL and SR and that L (or R) can be
interpreted as the recommendation to coordinate on party L (or R). We further assume that
(SKL ,SKR ) =
{
(qK , 1− qK) if (σL, σR) = ({E}, ∅),
(1− qK , qK) if (σL, σR) = (∅, {E}).
That is, qK is conventional party K’s prior that, before the election takes place, the signal will
prompt coordination on the only conventional party that excluded party E in its CPC—if only one
party did so.22 Unless otherwise stated, we will assume that both conventional parties have the
same priors, i.e. S := SL = SR. In such a case, we say that parties hold rational expectations and
denote q := qL = qR. When no confusion is possible, we refer to q as the signal’s prior distribution
instead of S. The assumption of rational expectations is relaxed in Section C.2 (see Appendix C),
where we show that it is not crucial for our results.
Second, we let f := f(σL, σR, σl, σr) denote the mapping that specifies the policy implemented by the
government, given the CPCs written, (σL, σR), and the election outcome, (σl, σr). It turns out that
under the one-party exclusion rule, the CPCs written in Stage 1, the realization of S in Stage 2,
and the votes cast by the voters in Stage 3 will uniquely determine the policies and perks chosen
in Stage 4 (up to the identity of the formateur). Thus, f is well-defined. This can be easily verified
with the help of Table 2.
To analyze the two games of political competition and government formation, G− and G+, we use the
concepts of correlated equilibrium and sequential rationality. More precisely, we refer to a profile of
pure strategies (σ∗L, σ
∗
R, σ
∗
l , σ
∗
r) as an equilibrium of G+ if the following two conditions are satisfied:
22We note that with the one-party exclusion rule, we do not need to specify priors for other combinations of CPCs,
as following the coordination signal will not be a best response for voters in those cases. However, such distributions
are also part of the game, and they will need to be specified in Section 5.
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(a) Conventional voters vote according to the signal when doing so is beneficial, i.e.,
vk(f(σ
∗
K , σ
∗
Kˆ
,Y ,Y)) ≥ vk(f(σ∗K , σ∗Kˆ , σk,Y)) for all σk ∈ {L,R} =⇒ σ∗k = Y .
(b) Strategies are sequentially rational. That is,
(b.1) for conventional voter k,
σ∗k ∈ arg max
σk∈{L,R}
vk(f(σ
∗
L, σ
∗
R, σk, σ
∗
kˆ
)).
(b.2) for conventional party K,
σ∗K ∈ arg max
σK∈{∅,{Kˆ},{E}}
ES
[
VK
(
f(σK , σ
∗
Kˆ
, σ∗l , σ
∗
r)
)
+ BK(σK , σ∗Kˆ , σ∗l , σ∗r)
]
,
where BK(σK , σ∗Kˆ , σ∗l , σ∗r) denotes K’s perks.
The operator ES [·] denotes expectation before the signal S is known. An equilibrium is in weakly
undominated strategies if beyond assuming the above definition, parties also eliminate weakly dom-
inated pure strategies. We refer to a profile of pure strategies (σ∗l , σ
∗
r) as an equilibrium of G− if
conditions (a) and (b.1) hold.
4 Solving the Game
We now solve our game of political competition and government formation—with and without the
possibility of drafting CPCs. We start with the former case.
4.1 Framework with CPCs
Consider game G+. We use backward induction to solve it.
4.1.1 Government formation (Stage 4)
For completeness, we recall the equilibrium dynamics of Stage 4. A single-party government will
only come about at the government formation stage if one of the conventional parties obtains both
votes from the two conventional voters as a result of one of them having acted strategically. By
contrast, if conventional voters vote sincerely, i.e., if each of them votes for the party whose most
preferred policy is closer to his own, a coalition between a conventional party and the extreme party
will result, given that at least one of the conventional parties has not excluded the extreme party in
its CPC. Only if both L and R have excluded E will a grand coalition come about. Table 2 contains
the policies that will be implemented in each case.
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4.1.2 Elections and coordination signal (Stages 2–3)
At the election stage, conventional voters have to decide whether to vote sincerely or strategically.
We distinguish three cases, depending on the CPCs written in Stage 1.
Case I: (σL, σR) = (∅, ∅)
When no party has excluded E, the correlation device’s suggestion to coordinate the votes on
one conventional party is not a best response for the voter who is prompted to vote strategically.
Indeed, due to Condition (8), both conventional voters will prefer a coalition between a conventional
party and E implementing policy pE to a single-party government formed by their less preferred
conventional party. This is depicted in Table 3, where the unique equilibrium outcome is marked in
gray.
σl
σr
L R
L vk(pL) vk(pE)
R vk(pE) vk(pR)
Table 3: Election game when (σL, σR) = (∅, ∅).
Case II: (σK , σKˆ) = (∅, {E})
Now assume that only one conventional party, Kˆ, has excluded the extreme party in its CPC and
that the correlation device signals coordination on one conventional party—either K or Kˆ. In either
case, suppose that one conventional voter does not follow the correlation device’s suggestion. Then
each conventional party will obtain one vote, K will form a coalition with the extreme party, and
pKE will be implemented. Following the signal of the correlation device, a single-party government
of either L or R will form. According to Condition (9), both conventional voters prefer a single-
party government of their less preferred conventional party to a coalition government formed by a
conventional party and party E implementing pKE. Consequently, the correlation signal is a best
response in the case where only one conventional party has excluded E from a coalition government.
This is depicted in Table 4, where the two possible equilibrium outcomes are marked in gray.
σl
σr
L R
L vk(pL) vk(pKE)
R vk(pKE) vk(pR)
Table 4: Election game when (σL, σR) = (∅, {E}).
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Case III: (σL, σR) = ({E}, {E})
When both conventional parties have excluded E, the conventional voters’ decisions will depend
on how they rank pLR, pR, and pL. Provided that Condition (6) holds, the equilibrium outcome is
always pLR. This is depicted in Table 5, where the equilibrium outcomes are marked in gray.
σl
σr
L R
L vk(pL) vk(pLR)
R vk(pLR) vk(pR)
σr
L R
L vk(pL) vk(pLR)
R vk(pLR) vk(pR)
Table 5: Election game when (σL, σR) = ({E}, {E}) and either vk(pLR) > vk(pK) (left table) or
vk(pLR) < vk(pK) (right table).
To sum up, the conventional voters will follow the signal to coordinate their voting behavior if and
only if one party has excluded E in its CPC. Otherwise, following the signal is not a best response
for one conventional voter, and voters will vote sincerely. Moreover, since conventional voters can
always coordinate their votes on either conventional party, neither a caretaker government nor a
coalition government of a conventional party and the extreme party will form in equilibrium when
the latter has weak bargaining power. Hence, policies pct, pLE and pRE cannot arise in equilibrium,
only pLR, pL, pR, and pE. The question remains, however, which of the latter policies will arise.
4.1.3 Coalition Preclusion Contracts (Stage 1)
The discussion in the rest of Section 4.1 is devoted very largely to the analysis of the incentives
for conventional parties to sign a CPC when such a possibility is available. We will assume that
party E will be excluded rather than not excluded by a conventional party when the latter is
indifferent between the two options. This tie-breaking rule is not essential.23 Under the one-party
exclusion rule we can summarize the contract choice game played by the conventional parties as in
Table 6, where V xK(p1, p2) := x · VK(p1) + (1− x) · VK(p2) for x ∈ [0, 1] and p1, p2 ∈ P .24
As can be observed in Table 6, an equilibrium of CPC choices will depend crucially on the conven-
tional parties’ beliefs regarding voter coordination, i.e., on the exact value of q. We proceed in two
steps.
First, suppose without loss of generality that L has excluded E. Then we analyze R’s incentives
to also exclude E. On the one hand, suppose that R decides to exclude E. From the discussion
in Section 4.1.2, we know that when both conventional parties exclude the extreme party, voters
23If the parameters of party and voter preferences are drawn from a non-degenerate continuous distribution, the
latter event has probability zero.
24We only consider conventional parties as writers of CPCs, since the extreme party has no incentive to exclude a
conventional party. This would only reduce its bargaining power at the government formation stage.
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∅ {E}
∅ B
2
+ VL(pE),
B
2
+ VR(pE) (1− q)B + V 1−qL (pL, pR), qB + V 1−qR (pL, pR)
{E} qB + V qL (pL, pR), (1− q)B + V qR(pL, pR) b+ VL(pLR), b+ VR(pLR)
Table 6: Conventional parties’ contract choice game. Row player is party L and column player is
party R.
will vote sincerely, and a grand coalition will result. On the other hand, in the case where R does
not exclude the possibility of forming a coalition with E, party R believes that with probability q a
single-party government of L will be established and with the complementary probability R will be
able to form a single-party government on its own. Consequently, signing a CPC excluding E given
that L has excluded E is profitable ex-ante for R if and only if
q · VR(pL) + (1− q) · (VR(pR) +B) ≤ VR(pLR) + b,
that is, if and only if
q ≥ (B − b) + VR(pR)− VR(pLR)
B + VR(pR)− VR(pL) ≡ q
c
R. (10)
The weak inequality sign follows from the tie-breaking rule. With regard to the incentives of L to
exclude E given that R does so, the symmetric condition needs to be satisfied, i.e.,
q ≥ (B − b) + VL(pL)− VL(pLR)
B + VL(pL)− VL(pR) ≡ q
c
L. (11)
Note that the right-hand sides of Inequalities (10) and (11) are strictly smaller than one, implying
that both conventional parties excluding E will be an equilibrium if, from these parties’ perspec-
tives, the probability that the voters will coordinate on the sole conventional party excluding E is
sufficiently high. We point out that qcK may be smaller or larger than
1
2
.
Second, given that the other conventional party does not sign a CPC, we obtain the following
necessary and sufficient conditions for a conventional party to exclude the extreme party from a
coalition:
q ≥
B
2
+ VR(pE)− VR(pL)
B + VR(pR)− VR(pL) ≡ q
n
R, (12)
q ≥
B
2
+ VL(pE)− VL(pR)
B + VL(pL)− VL(pR) ≡ q
n
L. (13)
As indicated, we use qcR, q
c
L, q
n
R, and q
n
L to denote the critical values that make the conventional
parties indifferent between excluding E and not signing a contract. Using Conditions (10)–(13),
we can then directly infer that both conventional parties excluding the extreme party will be an
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equilibrium whenever q ≥ qcL and q ≥ qcR. Moreover, neither conventional party signing a CPC will
be an equilibrium if q < qnL and q < q
n
R.
In our analysis, we will further assume that conventional parties are symmetric with respect to all
preference parameters. This will simplify the exposition but will not affect the main thrust of our
results. Moreover, it will enable us to concentrate on effects of CPCs that do not arise due to the
asymmetry of conventional parties. A possibility of this kind is investigated in Section C.4 (see
Appendix C).
Symmetry Condition 1 (SC1): qnL = q
n
R := q
n and qcL = q
c
R := q
c
In terms of the primitives of the model, this condition is equivalent to
(B − b) + VR(pR)− VR(pLR)
(B − b) + VL(pL)− VL(pLR) =
B
2
+ VR(pE)− VR(pL)
B
2
+ VL(pE)− VL(pR)
=
B + VR(pR)− VR(pL)
B + VL(pL)− VL(pR) .
We note that it suffices for SC1 to hold for us to impose the following standard conditions:
VR(pR)− VR(pL) = VL(pL)− VL(pR), (14)
VR(pE)− VR(pL) = VL(pE)− VL(pR), (15)
VR(pR)− VR(pLR) = VL(pL)− VL(pLR). (16)
For a complete characterization of the equilibria, the relations between qnK and q
c
K play a crucial
role. We distinguish two cases depending on the latter relation.25
Symmetry Condition 2A (SC2A): qnK < q
c
K for K ∈ {L,R}
From Conditions (10)–(13) it follows that SC2A can be written as
(VK(pK)− VK(pLR))− (VK(pLR)− VK(pKˆ)) >
(
b− B
2
)
+ (VK(pE)− VK(pLR)) . (17)
For given b, Condition (17) sets a lower bound on the difference in the relative utilities derived
from the single-party governments with respect to the grand coalition. This bound is given by the
utility difference between a coalition government with the extreme party and a grand coalition,
which consists of two terms, one relating to policy and one relating to perks. We emphasize that
SC2A requires certain symmetry properties within each party’s utility profile but does not imply a
statement about the relation between the parties’ utility profiles, e.g. about the relation of qcL and q
c
R.
Under SC1 and SC2A, the equilibria outcomes depending on parties’ beliefs on voter coordination
are
(σL, σR) =

(∅, ∅) if 0 ≤ q < qn,
(∅, {E}), ({E}, ∅) if qn ≤ q < qc,
({E}, {E}) if qc ≤ q ≤ 1.
(18)
25We do not consider the case qnK > q
c
K and q
c
Kˆ
> qn
Kˆ
, since this would contradict SC1.
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Symmetry Condition 2B (SC2B): qnK ≥ qcK for all K ∈ {L,R}
The interpretation of SC2B is similar to that of SC2A. Under SC1 and SC2B, the equilibria outcomes
depending on parties’ beliefs about voter coordination are
(σL, σR) =

(∅, ∅) if 0 ≤ q < qc,
(∅, ∅), ({E}, {E}) if qc ≤ q < qn,
({E}, {E}) if qn ≤ q ≤ 1.
(19)
To sum up, we have proved the following result:
Theorem 1
In the sequential game G+, any equilibrium under SC1 can be described for each coordination prior
q ∈ [0, 1] as follows:
(i) conventional parties will choose CPCs according to expression (18) (when SC2A holds) and
expression (19) (when SC2B holds),
(ii) voters will follow the recommendation of the correlation device if and only if only one conven-
tional party has excluded E and vote sincerely otherwise,
(iii) government formation will result in a grand coalition implementing policy pLR if (σL, σR) =
({E}, {E}), in a coalition government between one conventional party and E implementing
policy pE if (σL, σR) = (∅, ∅), and in single-party government of one conventional party, say
K, implementing its preferred policy pK , otherwise.
4.2 Framework with no CPCs
The situation without CPCs is simple and has been implicitly analyzed in the previous section, since
G− is a subgame of G+. For the sake of completeness, however, we also describe it here. If citizens vote
sincerely, none of the parties will be able to form a single-party government. Moreover, since both
conventional parties will prefer a coalition with the extreme party to a grand coalition government,
they will compete for E as a coalition partner. Consequently, E will have strong bargaining power,
thereby leading to policy pE within a coalition government with one of the conventional parties.
Does a conventional voter have an incentive to follow the coordination signal, deviate, and vote
strategically? The answer is negative. If one of the conventional voters votes strategically, the result
will be a single-party government run by the conventional party they do not support. According
to Condition (8), both conventional voters will prefer a coalition between L or R and E, who will
implement policy pE, to a single-party government by the conventional party they do not support.
Hence, the following result holds:
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Theorem 2
In the sequential game G−, any equilibrium of the game under SC1 can be described as follows:
(ii) voters vote sincerely,
(iii) government formation results in a coalition of one conventional party and the extreme party,
implementing policy pE.
In the light of Theorem 2, E’s choice of pE and e’s choice to vote for E when CPCs are not available
are thus rational. The reason is that pE is implemented, as desired by both E and e.
5 General Coalition Preclusion Contracts
So far we have discussed a particular specification of CPCs, where each party was allowed to preclude
only one other party from forming a coalition. If there is no restriction on the number of parties
that can be precluded in a CPC, we may encounter additional equilibria. This is shown next by the
analysis of the contract choice game for the conventional parties without the one-party exclusion
rule, as indicated in Table 7. Recall that V xK(p1, p2) := x · Vk(p1) + (1− x) · Vk(p2) for x ∈ [0, 1] and
p1, p2 ∈ P . Additionally, we let BxK be such that BxL = B · x and BxR = b · (1− x) for x ∈ [0, 1].
σL
σR
∅ {E} {L,E}
∅ B
2
+ VK(pE) B
1−q
K + V
1−q
K (pL, pR) B
1−q
K + V
1−q
K (pL, pR)
{E} BqK + V qK(pL, pR) b+ VK(pLR) B2 + V
1
2
K (pL, pR)
{R,E} BqK + V qK(pL, pR) B2 + V
1
2
K (pL, pR)
B
2
+ V
1
2
K (pL, pR)
Table 7: Conventional parties’ contract choice game without the one-party exclusion rule.
Some remarks are required. First, for conventional party K, strategy σK now selects an element of
{∅, {Kˆ}, {E}, {Kˆ, E}}. Since σK = ∅ and σK = {Kˆ} yield the same payoffs to party K for every
strategy of party Kˆ, we have only included in Table 7 those strategies that are not payoff-equivalent.
Second, without the one-party exclusion rule, priors of the coordination signal for cases where
(σK , σKˆ) 6= (∅, {E}) now do matter. In Table 7, we have assumed that priors for the coordination
signal are the same, namely q, whenever party K has excluded at least E and party Kˆ has not
excluded any party. When no coalition is feasible at all, however, we have assumed that the signal
will prompt coordination on either conventional party with probability 1
2
. Recall that when no
government coalition can be formed at all both conventional voters will always find it profitable to
coordinate their votes on one conventional party. When conventional parties are symmetric regarding
the CPCs offered, there is no reason to expect higher coordination on one conventional party than
21
on the other. In that case, either conventional party will receive a majority of votes and will form
a government with probability 1
2
.
Before we study the possible equilibria of the game defined in Table 7, it will be convenient to specify
another condition.
Risk Condition (RC): VK(pLR) ≥ V
1
2
K (pL, pR) for K ∈ {L,R}
This condition on the conventional parties’ utilities has the following appeal: If the policy outcomes
of a single-party government are distributed symmetrically in the policy space around the grand-
coalition policy outcome and parties have a concave utility function regarding policies, then RC
will hold. A concave utility function for the parties implies that they are risk-averse in connec-
tion with the policy outcome. Since conventional parties are also risk-averse regarding perks—see
Condition (2)—and parties’ utility is separable in perks and policies, RC implies that
b+ VK(pLR) ≥ B
2
+ V
1
2
K (pL, pR). (20)
A consequence of Condition (20) is that strategy {Kˆ, E} is weakly dominated by strategy {E} for
conventional party K. As a tie-breaking rule, we assume that in the case of indifference between
excluding only E or any other possible contract choice, strategy {E} will be chosen. The following
result is then straightforward:
Proposition 1
Under SC1 and RC, if conventional parties play no weakly dominated strategy, the equilibria of
game G+ (or G−) with the one-party exclusion rule are the same as the equilibria of game G+ (or
G−) without the one-party exclusion rule—as given by Theorem 1 (or Theorem 2).
Accordingly, the one-party exclusion rule is not needed if conventional parties play no weakly domi-
nated strategies. However, if conventional parties were to consider playing weakly dominated strate-
gies, further equilibria would arise without such exclusion rule. In particular, all coalitions may be
ruled out if coordination probability q is large enough. Not imposing the one-party exclusion rule
can thus have consequences on welfare (see next section). The reason is that the conventional parties
will be able to force single-party governments to come about more often than with the one-party ex-
clusion rule. This may bring about less utility for the voters than policy pE. We derive all additional
equilibria with weakly dominated strategies without the one-party exclusion rule in Appendix B.
Finally, we stress that both with and without the one-party exclusion rule, our analysis focused on
the situations where CPCs can make a difference in preventing a government coalition that includes
the extreme party. More broadly, in other contexts, one could ask whether the conventional parties
would use CPCs to enforce a single-party government to their own benefit? The answer to this
question depends crucially on voting behavior and on the parties’ risk aversion. Indeed, suppose
22
that perks are not high enough to tempt the conventional parties to form a coalition with the extreme
party. Then consider that one conventional party excluded the other conventional party, thereby
ruling out a grand coalition. Such a move would only be beneficial ex-ante if the voters rewarded it
with a sufficiently high probability of coordinating their votes on the party writing such a CPC. The
probability level that is necessary to encourage such behavior clearly depends on the risk aversion of
the parties pondering whether to renounce the certain outcome of a grand coalition and then opt for
an uncertain single-party government. If the probability that the voters coordinated on the other
conventional party instead were high enough, unilaterally writing a CPC excluding the voter’s most
preferred coalition—the grand coalition—would not be profitable. In this case, both conventional
parties excluding each other would not be an equilibrium either, since unilaterally refraining from
excluding the other conventional party would be rewarded with a (large probability of a) single
party government. We argue that it is reasonable to assume that voters tend to coordinate on the
party that does not exclude popular coalitions for the party’s own benefit. An indication for such
voter behavior might be the drop in popularity of the FDP in Germany after leaving the coalition
negotiations.
6 Welfare Analysis and Implementation
In this section we study (i) the welfare implications of CPCs and (ii) whether and how CPCs could
be implemented.
6.1 Welfare analysis
Any analysis of welfare will hinge on four key elements. These are whether the one-party exclusion
rule applies or not, how likely we regard each of the possible multiple equilibria to be, the criterion
used to measure welfare, and the information available when we apply this criterion. The last-named
element is important because the level of knowledge about the likelihood of coordination occurring
in favor of a conventional party that excludes E depends on the stage at which we measure welfare.
To analyze the different timing possibilities, it will be useful to add a Stage 0 to the political games
G− and G+, in which nature selects the exact value of q from a given distribution. We can therefore
analyze the impact of CPCs on welfare ex-ante, i.e. before the game starts at Stage 0 or interim,
i.e. before parties write the CPCs in Stage 1, but as soon as the realization of the exact value of
q—but not of the signal itself—is common knowledge to all players. Throughout this section, we
only consider rational beliefs, i.e. q = qL = qR, and focus on the ex-ante case. The more general
cases are in Appendix B (see also Appendix C).
As a criterion to measure welfare, we use throughout this section (and in the appendices) a welfare
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function W (·). Since we have established that voters’ disutility from perks is the same whatever the
government coalition, we consider that W (·) depends solely on the policy implemented, regardless
of the exact distribution of perks among parties. Moreover, we assume that W (·) satisfies
W (pLR) > W (pE). (21)
The above condition is rather mild as it only requires that the shift embodied in the extreme policy
pE (i.e, the shift d¯ in dimension D bundled with the median policy in dimension T ) is socially less
desirable than the policy that would be implemented by the grand coalition, namely pLR. The latter
is the same median policy in T but no shift in D. Condition (21) is thus of ordinal nature and
consistent with the assumption that d¯ is undesirable for a majority of voters. If we take a utilitarian
approach, for instance, it suffices for this condition to hold that the share of extreme voters is not
too large. This is shown in Appendix B.
We stress that policy pE, and hence also d¯, is nonetheless a feasible choice and, moreover, it is
sufficiently attractive for conventional parties to include such policy in certain coalition government
agreements. In particular, as already mentioned, pE must be appealing enough from the conventional
parties’ and the conventional voters’ perspective compared to other possible policies in P for the
extreme party to be able to form a government coalition with one of the former parties (see party
and voter preferences in Section 3.3.1 and Section 3.3.2, respectively). The fact that pE is a possible
policy outcome thus makes it very difficult to prevent its implementation (or that of d¯) by legal
means, say by banning either policy altogether. Doing so would have to be done on a policy-by-
policy basis and would effectively require banning party E, whose defining policy is precisely d¯.
Banning such a party may be straightforward, but the possibility to do so is not embraced in most
democracies.26 CPCs are a device that could help to deter such outcomes once and for all without
the need of such drastic measures.27
We also recall that in Section 4 we showed that either with or without CPCs, policies that differ
from pLR, pL, pR, and pE cannot arise in equilibrium. From the point of view of the two conventional
voters, any pair from pL, pR, and pE cannot be ranked according to the Pareto criterion, while pLR
and pE can be. How society as a whole ranks these different policies is obviously relevant in assessing
the impact that CPCs may have on welfare. The following condition on W (·), of cardinal nature,
26Exceptions are parties that threaten the functioning of democracy.
27A two-round election like the one used in France can also be an effective way of precluding extreme parties from
holding executive offices in a presidential system. CPCs are fundamentally different from such multi-round procedures
insofar as they do not restrict the voters’ action space in the final election, but rather increase the parties’ action
space by offering them the possibility of a credible exclusion of coalitions. This makes them suitable for parliamentary
democracies with proportional representation. We stress that the possibility to draft CPCs neither requires labeling
parties or policies as “extreme” nor does it require to make a welfare assessment of all potential policies. CPCs
will work as described in the paper if the conditions that we have assumed hold, or they will be redundant if such
conditions are not met.
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turns out to play a crucial role in determining whether CPCs are welfare-improving or not:
1
2
W (pL) +
1
2
W (pR) > W (pE). (22)
The left-hand side of Condition (22) contains expected societal utility when there is an equal prob-
ability that either conventional party will form a single-party government, while the right-hand side
contains the societal valuation of pE. When interpreted within our two-dimensional space P = T ×D,
Condition (22) ensures that the society is not too risk-averse in T .28 If W (·) is concave in T and
pR and pL are symmetrically located with respect to pLR, Condition (22) is more restrictive than
Condition (21).
For the main result regarding ex-ante welfare, EH [W (·)], i.e., welfare before q is realized and becomes
common knowledge, we consider that the exact value of q is distributed with full support on [0, 1]
according to a non-degenerate probability distribution with cumulative distribution H(·).
Theorem 3
Under SC1 and Condition (21), we obtain the following results:
(a) CPCs with the one-party exclusion rule are ex-ante welfare-improving when SC2B holds.
(b) CPCs with the one-party exclusion rule are ex-ante welfare-improving when SC2A holds if
Condition (22) applies.29
Moreover, assume that Condition (2) holds tight, i.e. B = 2b. Then
(c) CPCs with the one-party exclusion rule are ex-ante welfare-improving if b is large enough.
(d) CPCs without the one-party exclusion rule may not be ex-ante welfare-improving even if b is
large enough.
A formal proof can be found in Appendix B, but the intuition of the theorem can be summarized
with the help of expressions (18) and (19). First, consider Part (a) of the theorem. If SC2B
holds, equilibria with the one-party exclusion rule entail that either both conventional parties will
not exclude any other party, in which case the introduction of CPCs is devoid of bite, or both
conventional parties will exclude the extreme party. In the latter case, a grand coalition occurs
which will implement pLR. The latter outcome is preferable to pE, which is the outcome without
28If pR and pL are symmetrically located with respect to pLR, the expected policy when pL and pR are equally
likely is pLR. Condition (22) requires that the loss of societal utility due to uncertainty in the continuous policy be
offset by the societal loss of carrying out the extreme policy with certainty.
29We assume that, for a given value of q, all possible equilibrium outcomes are equally likely ex-ante, i.e. before
the signal is realized. This means that the probability of L excluding E is the same as the probability of R excluding
E. Without this assumption, it suffices to replace Condition (22) by the stronger Condition (23) for Part (b) to hold.
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CPCs. Consequently, the expected welfare gain from introducing CPCs will be positive if the
probability that q > qc is positive.
Regarding Part (b) of Theorem 3, if SC2A holds instead of SC2B, a single party government by
a conventional party will be formed with equal probability for L and R when the coordination
probability q is in the interval [qn, qc). Condition (22) says that the expected welfare from single-
party governments by conventional parties is higher than the welfare from the policy of a small
coalition with strong bargaining power on the part of the extreme party, pE. Then we can apply the
same line of argument as before. If CPCs have bite, they lead to more favorable policy outcomes
in expectation than the policy that will be implemented without them. Hence the expected welfare
gain from introducing CPCs will be positive if the probability that q > qn is larger than zero.
However, if the expected welfare from equally likely single-party governments is smaller than that
obtained from pE, i.e. if Condition (22) does not hold, it will depend on the probability that
q ∈ [qn, qc) whether the expected welfare gain from the introduction of CPCs will be positive or
negative. Both probabilities qn and qc converge to 1
2
if b → ∞ and b
B
→ 1
2
. Consequently, we can
find a sufficiently large amount of perks b such that the interval [qn, qc) becomes small enough for
the expected welfare gain associated with the introduction of CPCs to be positive. This describes
Part (c) of Theorem 3.30
Lastly, we explain Part (d) of Theorem 3. In cases where parties play weakly dominated strategies
and the one-party exclusion rule does not apply, the conventional parties may force single-party
governments to come about whenever q > qn, while if q ≤ qn CPCs are not used to exclude another
party. If Condition (22) holds, single-party governments are socially preferred to small coalitions
with strong bargaining power on the part of the extreme party. Hence, the introduction of CPCs
will again lead to expected welfare gains. However, if Condition (22) does not hold, CPCs will lead
to lower social welfare. This will be true even for large amounts of perks, as qn will converge to 1
2
,
implying that single-party governments will come about if q > 1
2
.
As already mentioned, in Appendix B we analyze interim welfare, i.e., welfare evaluated after the
realization of the exact value of q is known. We obtain a result similar to Theorem 3—see Theorem 4
therein. From an interim perspective, however, it is the following (ordinal) condition—which is
stronger than Condition (22)—that is needed when SC2A holds for CPCs to be welfare-improving:
min{W (pL),W (pR)} > W (pE). (23)
30The reason why qn − qc converges to zero if B = 2b and b approaches infinity is as follows: For conventional
party K, the difference in expected utility from perks associated with pE and pK , as reflected in the numerator of q
n,
is the same as the difference between pK and pLR as captured in the numerator of q
c. Consequently, the difference
between qn and qc originates from the differences regarding policy. This latter part becomes less important if perks
increase, in particular negligible if perks go to infinity. That qn and qc must converge to 12 then follows from the fact
that expected utility from perks associated with pE and with pLR are half the size of those associated with pLR. If
we changed these assumptions, the critical probabilities would converge to different values.
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The welfare analysis just set out underlines the importance of the signal as a coordination device
when only one conventional party excludes party E. This signal can be understood as media cov-
erage, advertising or opinion polls. The central point for CPCs to be effective is that for the party
being the only one signing a CPC, doing so must lead to a sufficiently high probability that voters
will coordinate on voting for it. Although in our model we have assumed that the signal is exoge-
nous, there are several ways to endogenize it. For instance, one could consider an investment decision
for parties to advertise their policies, where the probability of coordination on one of the parties
depends on their relative investments. Signing a CPC could then be interpreted as an additional
“costless” investment, since the media would be covering such an event without much marketing
effort.31 Alternatively, signing a CPC could amplify the investment of the party doing so. Both
possibilities would produce an advantage in terms of publicity to voters for the party signing the
CPC.
Finally, it is also worth noting that some dynamic considerations may affect the welfare implications
of CPCs. For example, an extreme party in opposition to a grand coalition may benefit from
excluding all major political parties in terms of vote share in the following election. On the contrary,
having shown a sobering performance in government, an extreme party may lose voter support in
subsequent elections. CPCs offer a way to keep the extreme party out of government without
incurring the welfare loss of having such a party in government for once to open voters’ eyes. While
it is true that CPCs may lead to an increase in the extreme party’s vote share by bringing about a
grand coalition, it has not been often observed that by ruling out all coalitions, a extreme party has
become so strong as to form a single-party government. In summary, the welfare benefits of CPCs
are thus likely to be positive even when considering behavioral aspects outside of the model.
6.2 Implementation of CPCs
Although in our model CPCs with the one-party exclusion rule are welfare-improving, it is by no
means certain that they will be introduced. To analyze this question, we first take a legal perspective
and then focus on the political parties’ incentives to enable the drafting of CPCs. Lastly, we sum
up and take a more general view on the implementation problem.
31In practice, the public correlating device could be attention in media. One could for instance proxy the signal
precision by measuring media and social media attention for each party, either in aggregate terms or through targeted
content analyses. Attention on social media like Facebook and Twitter are particularly easy to measure as they are
part of the social media activity itself.
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6.2.1 A legal perspective: The German case
Without any doubt, the implementation of CPCs in practice would require careful planning. If
envisioned for Germany, for instance, CPCs would entail the following considerations:32 First and
foremost, it is an important issue whether CPCs are subject to private law or to constitutional
law. Since political parties are associations without legal capacity, CPCs would be, in principle,
regulated by private law. Yet, as soon as parties participate in elections, they are also subject to
public law. This dual legal position entails that the timing of CPCs would be crucial: if a CPC is
to be concluded closely before elections, a party that signs it will be considered an institution of the
state and as such will be subject to constitutional law.
From another perspective, one might ask whether a legal basis for CPCs is necessary at all. While
German constitutional law comprises no formal provision for this type of contract, it does not have
one either for so-called coalition contracts (“Koalitionsvertra¨ge”). Yet, coalition contracts are gener-
ally accepted based on German constitutional law, which stipulates that the Federal President must
propose a candidate for the office of Chancellor without debate in parliament (“ohne Aussprache”,
see Art. 63(1) GG).33 This absence of debate only makes sense if the parties have previously been
allowed to agree on key policy issues for the coming legislature period. Coalition contracts are also
enabled by Art. 21(1) GG, which stipulates that parties are actors of the development of the peo-
ple’s will (“Die Parteien wirken bei der politischen Willensbildung mit.”). This right to act also
has to be exerted before taking political action, i.e. before a government is built. Thus, if coalition
contracts are generally accepted on the basis of these two articles of constitutional law, CPC should
be acceptable, too, as they can be described as coalition contracts with opposite sign.
At any rate, if one were to give CPCs a legal foundation to secure enforcement, German constitutional
law—see e.g. Art. 21 GG—should be completed by a specific provision allowing CPCs, coupled with
an enforcement rule specified at a lower legal level. The latter would stipulate that violations of
a CPC entail a specific and substantial reduction of public funding—equivalently, they could also
entail fines. German law already has a tradition of imposing such fines (Art. 31(2) ParteiG), e.g.
when large donations are not made transparent.34 The catalogue for imposing financial penalties on
parties could simply be extended by penalties for the violation of CPCs.
32The information is based on discussions with law scholars from the Max-Planck-Institute in Bonn and the
University of Heidelberg.
33Grundgesetz fu¨r die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (GG), http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/index.
html, retrieved December 4, 2017.
34Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Gesetz u¨ber die politischen Parteien (Parteiengesetz, ParteiG),
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/partg/PartG.pdf, retrieved December 4, 2017.
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6.2.2 A political economy perspective
While it is true that the implementation of CPCs may entail more legal issues than those we have
just discussed, one can still try to see whether in our model, political parties would favor such a
possibility. In addition, one should also account for the possibility that if CPCs were ever introduced,
they would risk being manipulated. Therefore we now analyze the incentives of parties to introduce
CPCs and to manipulate the rules governing their use. The critical issues are:
• Can a conventional party bypass CPCs by accepting the votes of parties that were excluded
in its CPC?
• Will the possibility of writing CPCs be introduced at the constitutional stage?
• Are there incentives for newly-created governments to abolish the law regulating CPCs?
We develop our analysis in three steps. First, CPCs are political contracts that constrain the
choices regarding government coalition formation but do not impose any direct restriction on policy
outcomes. Hence, the verification whether a party honors or violates its CPC has to occur at the
stage where the government is formed through a vote of confidence. Later on, when the parliament
decides on particular policies, CPCs have no bite. Nevertheless, conventional parties may try to
bypass a CPC by forming a minority government tolerated by the extreme party. This could occur
by (secretly) supporting the conventional party when the vote of confidence takes place and by
openly supporting policy compromises with the conventional party later on. To avoid such types of
manipulations, verification of CPCs should be designed with care. In particular, one could specify
that a party does not violate its CPC if the share of supporting votes obtained in the vote of
confidence from parties that are not excluded in its CPC is at least 50%.35 Otherwise, the party
would be subject to the penalization associated with CPC violation. Naturally, if a conventional
party anticipated the scenario where the votes of a party excluded in its CPC were necessary to form
a government, such conventional party would renounce proposing a government altogether to avoid
being punished.36 This would ensure that the extreme party has as much power in parliamentary
democracies with CPCs as in standard parliamentary democracies, where CPCs are absent.
Second, we now demonstrate that both conventional parties R and L would support a law introducing
CPCs with the one-party exclusion rule whenever they are risk-averse or perks are high. Indeed,
while the situation without CPCs yields a government formed by each conventional party and the
extreme party with probability 1
2
, which implements pE, the situation with CPCs yields the following
35As those votes may be secret, verification can be achieved by a third person (authority or judge) or by codes in
electronic ballots identifying party affiliation.
36One could add an “Acceptance stage” following a confidence vote to allow a conventional party to renounce
government formation if a successful vote of confidence violated its CPC.
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outcomes: On the one hand, if SC2B holds, either there will be no change compared to the situation
without CPCs or pLR will be implemented by the grand coalition. It will suffice to focus on the
latter situation to delineate the incentives for introducing CPCs. Throughout our analysis, we have
implicitly assumed that37
VK(pLR) + b >
1
2
· (VK(pE) +B) + 1
2
· (VK(pE) + 0) .
Hence, from a constitutional perspective both conventional parties prefer the certain possibility of
a grand coalition to the stochastic possibility leading to a coalition government of a conventional
party plus the extreme party with equal probability.
On the other hand, when SC2A holds, the situation is a bit more involved. In such a case either
there will be no change compared to the situation without CPCs, or pLR will be implemented by
the grand coalition, or a single-party government of either conventional party, say K, will be formed
and will implement policy pK . The first and second possibilities are the same as in the case where
SC2B holds. Accordingly, we focus on the latter possibility, which occurs whenever q ∈ [qn, qc). In
such a case, conventional party K’s expected utility will be higher than in the case without CPCs
if the following sufficient condition holds:
1
2
· VK(pK) + 1
2
· VK(pKˆ) > VK(pE). (24)
Interpreted within our two-dimensional space P = T ×D, the above condition ensures that party K
is not too risk-averse in dimension T with respect to the shift proposed by the extreme party in
dimension D. The following result is then straightforward:
Proposition 2
Both conventional parties favor the introduction of CPCs if Condition (24) holds or perks are large
enough.
To sum up, before a campaign for an election starts, both conventional parties would favor the intro-
duction of CPCs under either of the aforementioned plausible assumptions—regardless of whether
SC2A or SC2B holds. In such circumstances, they could successfully engineer a change in the con-
stitution to permit this type of political contracts as they would typically have a supermajority of
members in the parliament, a threshold which is often required for constitutional changes.38 Such a
move would also be aligned with a long-term concern about the stability of the political system, a
goal that would most likely be of interest for conventional parties.
Third, newly-formed governments may have an incentive to abolish the law governing the use and
application of CPCs. A conventional party, say Kˆ, may even be tempted to form a government with
37For an explicit condition, we refer to Condition (28) in Section A.2 (see Appendix A).
38Often, 2/3 or 3/4 supermajorities are required to change the constitution. Of course, the extreme party dislikes
the introduction of CPCs, as it may lose its influence on government formation and policies.
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the extreme party excluded in its CPC and then abolish the law governing CPCs immediately after.
There are two ways to prevent such attempts. First, one could impose a clause in the constitution
stipulating that laws governing CPCs cannot be abolished retroactively, so that abolishing the law is
not beneficial for a conventional party once it has formed a coalition with the extreme party. Second,
one could stipulate that abolition itself requires a supermajority, as it may require an amendment of
the constitution. Because after the elections there is always at least one conventional party in favor
of CPCs, a supermajority requirement would effectively block the elimination of the law governing
CPCs.39 Note that from the perspective of conventional party K, with K 6= Kˆ, it holds that
min{b+ VK(pLR), B + VK(pE), B + VK(pKE)} > max{VK(pE), VK(pKˆE)}. (25)
To understand Condition (25), consider the worst possible outcome for the party which is not
contemplating breaking its CPC and forming a coalition with E if the law is not removed, namely
party K. Then such an outcome yields a higher utility to K than the best possible outcome when Kˆ
wants to eliminate the law (and not honor its CPC). Hence K will never support such a constitutional
change after the election and before the government is formed and the supermajority to abolish the
law regulating CPCs will not be achieved.
6.2.3 A summary: Changing political landscape and larger number of parties
The central aim of CPCs is to prevent extreme policy shifts favored by a small minority of voters,
while still allowing coalitions among conventional parties. In our model with one extreme party, the
one-party exclusion rule is sufficient to achieve both goals.
With a changing political landscape, where new parties enter the political competition (or, less
common, existing parties leave), such an exclusion rule would nevertheless have to be adapted. We
show in Section C.1 (see Appendix C) that with two extreme parties, similar results regarding the
positive welfare effects of CPCs are obtained if we consider a two-party exclusion rule. This suggests
that a natural way of adapting CPCs to changing environments would be to allow the exclusion of
a number of parties equal to the number of extreme parties. This would enable the conventional
parties to credibly commit to not forming a coalition with an extreme party. As already mentioned,
not using the exclusion possibilities for this purpose would probably set them at a disadvantage
relative to the other conventional party in terms of vote popularity.
In reality, however, it may not always be easy to (legally) verify if a party is extreme. One possibility
to circumvent this problem could be to allow to exclude N − 2 parties from a coalition, where N
is the total number of parties taking part in the election. In the case with only two conventional
39In such case, the two conventional parties combined would always be able to devoid of content any CPC precluding
the grand coalition. If the possibility that this “escape clause” may be used were anticipated by voters, ruling out
the grand coalition by means of a CPC would no longer be credible.
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parties, this would be equivalent to allowing to exclude any number of extreme parties. In cases with
more than two conventional parties, CPCs with an (N − 2)-exclusion rule might, in principle, be
used to exclude the “socially first-best coalition”. Regarding the welfare properties of CPCs in this
case, the central question is which coalition would form without CPCs. One would expect that when
CPCs are written and have bite, they will typically prevent a government with an extreme party
and lead to a welfare improvement, if not to the first best. The central criterion of whether parties
can benefit from excluding coalitions among conventional parties for their own benefit is whether
voters can and will punish them sufficiently in terms of vote share, say by sending such parties into
opposition. As mentioned in Section 5, we argue that this is likely to be the case.
7 Conclusions and Extensions
Coalition Preclusion Contracts (CPCs) are an institutional device that can provide proportional-
representation parliamentary democracies with greater resilience against the influence of extreme
parties in government formation and policy-making. As coalition formation is observable and verifi-
able, CPCs are simple to implement. We have suggested that, on balance, these political contracts
moderate policies and improve welfare when coupled with a one-party exclusion rule.40 Because ex-
treme parties entering government are not rare, CPCs could thus be introduced on an experimental
basis in current parliamentary democracies.
Beyond the normative value of the paper, our results can also be interpreted from a purely positive
perspective to the extent that they provide insights with regard to when and why credible and non-
credible party announcements about possible coalitions are relevant for policy. Our results also help
us gain some intuition about the social value of parties’ commitments regarding coalition formation.
Several extensions of our model could be investigated, beyond the one including two extreme parties
instead of just one. First, we could relax the assumption of rational expectations. Second, we could
consider a continuum of voters. Third, we could allow asymmetric conventional parties. Fourth, we
could introduce uncertainty with respect to the support of the extreme party in the election. Fifth,
we could limit the power of the extreme party in bilateral negotiations with conventional parties by
constraining the offers acceptable for these latter parties. Sixth, we could consider that perks increase
with the parliamentary support for the government coalition. Seventh and last, we could analyze
the long-term costs and benefits of CPCs for parties and society by considering multiple elections.
In Appendix C (see supplementary material) we have pursued all these extensions. Overall, they
reveal that our findings are quite robust. Of course, numerous further issues wait to be explored,
such as the possibility to combine CPCs with endogenous platform choices.
40CPCs should under all circumstances honor constitutional rights of minorities.
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A Appendix: Model Assumptions (Supplementary Mate-
rial)
In this appendix we discuss in detail all the assumptions made in our model, with particular emphasis on
voter and party preferences.
A.1 A spatial model
Before we provide a rationale for the various model assumptions, we prove Lemma 1, showing that if we
consider a spatial model with voter and party preferences being single-peaked in each policy dimension,
such assumptions require two dimensions at least.
Lemma 1
Assume that P ⊆ Rn, that Conditions (7)–(9) hold, and that the conventional voter and the conventional
party preferences are single-peaked in each dimension. Then, if the policy resulting from the bargaining
between any two parties is in each dimension a convex combination of their most preferred policies, P
cannot be embedded in a one-dimensional space, so n > 1.
Proof:
We proceed by establishing a contradiction: we suppose that P ⊆ R. Without loss of generality, let
pL < pR.
41 From the bargaining protocol it then follows that pL < pLR < pR. We can then further assume
without loss of generality that pLR < pE . Let pk denote voter k’s ideal policy, with k ∈ {l, r, e}. We
distinguish two possibilities:
Case I: pL < pLR < pE < pR.
In this case, since the bargaining protocol results in a convex combination of ideal policies in each policy
dimension, we have pE < pRE < pR. We distinguish two subcases:
Case I.A: pl ≤ pE
In this subcase we obtain vl(pRE) ≥ vl(pR), which contradicts Condition (9).
Case I.B: pE < pl
In this subcase we obtain vl(pE) ≥ vl(pLR), which contradicts Condition (7).
Case II: pL < pLR < pR < pE .
We distinguish two subcases:
Case II.A: pl ≤ pR
In this subcase we obtain vl(pR) ≥ vl(pE), which contradicts Condition (8).
Case II.B: pR < pl
In this subcase we obtain vl(pR) ≥ vl(pLR), which contradicts Conditions (7)–(8).
2
41Note that, due to Conditions (7)–(9), no two policies in P are equally desirable according to the voters’ prefer-
ences.
A.1
A.2 Discussion of party preferences
First, the most preferred policy of a conventional party is the one it will implement, if it is able to form a
single-party government. The rationale is obvious, since a party having a majority of seats in parliament
can implement its most preferred policy. That is,
{pK} = arg max
p∈P
VK(p). (26)
Second, when a conventional party receives one vote and no CPC has been written, party E has strong
bargaining power. We have assumed that the policy implemented in this case by a coalition between a
conventional party and party E will yield lower utility than the policy implemented by the grand coalition.
That is,
VK(pLR) > VK(pE). (27)
Condition (27) says that, from the perspective of a conventional party, the policy compromise that needs
to be made with the extreme party to form a coalition government yields lower utility than the compromise
that needs to be made with the other conventional party in the grand coalition. Recall that when each party
receives one vote and no CPC has been written, there is a probability of 1/2 that each conventional party
will be in a government together with E. Condition (27) also implies that from an ex-ante viewpoint, i.e.,
before elections have been held, any conventional party will prefer the policy outcome of a grand-coalition
government to the outcome of a coalition government formed by a conventional party and the extreme party
if both conventional parties have the same chance to form such a coalition ex-post. Using Conditions (2)
and (27), we obtain
VK(pLR) + b > VK(pE) +
1
2
B. (28)
By contrast, from an ex-post viewpoint, i.e. once elections have been held, any conventional party will
prefer to form a government with the extreme party, as the latter party will be able to offer higher perks
in return for implementing its desired policy shift. More specifically, we have assumed Condition (5), i.e.,
VK(pE) +B > VK(pLR) + b.
Note that the above inequality sets a lower bound for B − b.
Third, when the extreme party has weak bargaining power, it is also more attractive ex-post for the
conventional party that did not exclude party E in its CPC to form a coalition with it than with the other
conventional party. The reason is that whatever the utility loss associated with the policy implemented in
a coalition with the extreme party, it will be offset by higher perks. That is, we have assumed that
VK(pKE) +B > VK(pLR) + b. (29)
Condition (29) imposes another lower bound on B − b and follows from Condition (5) if
VK(pKE) > VK(pE). (30)
For our analysis, it sufficed to impose the latter condition.
Fourth, utility from perks is high enough for any conventional party to prefer ex-ante any outcome in which
there is a significant probability that it will take part in the government to any outcome in which it will
not do so with certainty. It has been sufficient to assume that
VK(pE) +
1
2
B > VK(pKˆ). (31)
We note that the above condition imposes a lower bound on B.
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Fifth, we have assumed that a conventional party is better off when the other conventional party is in a
single-party government than when such a party forms a coalition with the extreme party, the latter with
weak bargaining power, i.e.
VK(pKˆ) > VK(pKˆE). (32)
As we have seen, when the extreme party has weak bargaining power and forms a coalition with a conven-
tional party, each of the two parties will be able to impose part of their policy agenda. This will result in
a very unfavorable outcome for the other conventional party.
Sixth and last, the policy implemented by a caretaker government is the worst possible outcome for both
conventional parties, i.e.,
{pct} = arg min
p∈P
VK(p). (33)
Summing up, from Conditions (26), (28), and (29)–(33) we derive the preference ranking as given by (3)
and (4) in Section 3.3.1. Such orderings are not very demanding when parties are mainly office-oriented
and perks-seekers.
A.3 Discussion of voter preferences, rationale for the model and main
assumptions
Lastly, we discuss the assumptions on conventional voter preferences together with a few other assumptions
of our model. First, Condition (6) ensures that conventional voter k will lean more towards the position
of conventional party K. This renders party and voters labels meaningful. Second, Condition (7) requires
that both conventional voters prefer the median policy in the usual left-right dimension to the discrete shift
in the orthogonal dimension. Both assumptions are standard. Third, we have also assumed that
{pct} = arg min
p∈P
vk(p). (34)
Condition (34) can be interpreted together with Condition (33) in the sense of the Nash bargaining: pct
specifies the disagreement point when conventional voters do not coordinate their votes and no coalition is
allowed by CPCs. Now we emphasize the following, more contentious assumptions:
(A) There are only three voters and three parties. Moreover, only voters and parties labeled conventional
are effectively players in the game: The extreme party E and the extreme voter e are “non-strategic”.
(B) The bargaining power of the extreme party in the government formation process—which is determined
by CPCs—is key in determining the policy outcome, provided that Conditions (8) and (9) hold.
Let us discuss (A) and (B). Regarding (A), the assumption that there are few voters is not essential, provided
that voters can coordinate. This is shown in Appendix C. A one-to-one correspondence is established there
between equilibria in both our simple model and a micro-founded model with a continuum of voters. We
can thus interpret this as saying that voter l (or r) represents the mass of voters leaning more towards the
political position of party L (or R) but might consider voting for the other conventional party for strategic
reasons.
By contrast, both the extreme voter e (as representative of a certain share of voters) and the extreme
party E care mainly about the implementation of d = d¯. On the one hand, d = d¯ is party E’s defining
characteristic and acts as an ideological constraint on its mobility (see Mueller, 2004; Benabou, 2008). This
implies that accepting d = 0 would lead to a “collapse” of E, as the party would lose its reputation and its
raison d’eˆtre. Thus, party E will only agree to form a government coalition if this coalition will bring about
the policy shift, i.e., only if one of the following policies is chosen: pE , pLE , and pRE . The assumption that
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the second policy dimension, D, is binary thus captures the nature of E’s mobility in the negotiations.42
On the other hand, e will always vote for E. This is reasonable, as doing so is a necessary condition for
implementation of d = d¯. Additionally, e might vote for E because he also attaches some utility to casting
such a vote.
Finally, the situation with more than three parties is interesting in itself. It is addressed in Appendix C.
There we show that in the presence of more than one extreme party the one-party exclusion rule needs to
be adjusted.
Regarding (B), we focus separately on Conditions (8) and (9). It will be convenient to consider Figure 2,
which depicts some party and voter preferences in a two-dimensional policy space. For better understanding
of the figure, D takes on discrete values and pct is not depicted.
(1− α)pi αpi
√
pi2E + (1− α)
2pi2
√
pi2E + α
2pi2
pE
XE
pLE pRE
pl prpLRpL pR
T
D
Figure 2: A two-dimensional policy space and the voters’ indifference curves (“quadratic” for both conven-
tional voters with bliss points pl and pr, and “lexicographic” for the extreme voter and the extreme party
with bliss point pE).
We start with Condition (8), i.e. we assume that party E has strong bargaining power. On the one hand,
the policy choice when E is in the government coalition may reflect the true preferences of its members
(or of its constituency) given its bargaining power and that of its partner. In this approach, pE would
be selected when E has strong bargaining power—and both conventional parties compete a` la Bertrand—
simply because this gives maximum utility to party E. On the other hand, if E’s only concern were to
implement the aforementioned shift, its bliss point could simply derive from strategic reasons. By choosing
pE , the extreme party would thus try to ensure that Condition (8) holds for both conventional voters. In
Figure 2, we observe that
{pE} = arg max
p∈XE
{min{vl(p), vr(p)}} .
42It would actually suffice for D to be discrete or bounded. Assuming that D is binary simply facilitates the
interpretation of our model and can be done without any loss of generality.
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The policy choice when the extreme party has strong bargaining power is hence polarized only in the second
policy dimension.
We now analyze Condition (9). When the extreme party has weak bargaining power and K is the only
conventional party with whom it can form a coalition, the latter party has greater power to dictate policy,
provided the discrete shift is carried out. Accordingly, party K solves the following problem:43
{pKE} = arg max
p∈XE
{VK(p)} .
The policy choice when the extreme party has weak bargaining power is thus polarized in the two policy
dimensions.
In real-world examples, ideology and strategy concerns are not mutually exclusive reasons for extreme
parties to aim for the median position in the policy dimension that does not define its raison d’eˆtre. For
instance, in the 2015 regional elections of Catalonia, Spain, the coalition Junts pel S´ı referred to earlier
advocated a discrete shift (independence of Catalonia) while maintaining a close-to-median position with
regard to the usual left-right policy issues.
In no way we claim that the aforementioned conditions hold in every political system. However, if CPCs
are not available and Condition (8) did not hold, conventional voters would always find it convenient to
coordinate their votes on one conventional party. This would prevent the extreme party from entering
government, and CPCs would not be necessary at all. In this paper we have limited ourselves to situations
where conventional parties form government coalitions with an extreme party. Hence, whatever the reason,
Condition (8) has to hold in situations of this type. In turn, if Condition (9) does not hold, then no CPCs
will be offered in equilibrium, which renders this new political institution redundant. Accordingly, if CPCs
brought about welfare improvements when the aforementioned condition holds, we could say that in general
CPCs weakly bring about welfare improvements. This justifies restricting our analysis to a setting where
Condition (9) is satisfied.
To illustrate the kind of policy spaces that derive from our assumptions, we conclude this section with a
more in-depth analysis of Figure 2. In such a figure, tL < tl < tm < tr < tR and preferences are Euclidean
for conventional parties and conventional voters. Let d(p1, p2) denote the Euclidean distance between
p1 ∈ P and p2 ∈ P. Then, pi = d(pLR, pL) = d(pLR, pR), piE = d(pLR, pE), and α = d(pl,pLR)pi = d(pr,pLR)pi
are the parameters indicated. On the one hand, pi captures the parties’ degree of polarization in the left-
right dimension. piE refers to the degree of polarization between party positions in the orthogonal policy
dimension. On the other hand, α is a measure for the degree of polarization between the conventional
parties’ positions and the conventional voters’ positions. Conditions (7)–(9) imply respectively that
max{α, 1− α}pi <
√
pi2E + α
2pi2, (35)√
pi2E + α
2pi2 < (1 + α)pi, (36)
(1 + α)pi <
√
pi2E + (1− α)2pi2. (37)
A necessary condition for Conditions (35)–(37) to be compatible is that 0 < α < 12 . This means that the
electorate is much less polarized than the parties, yet it must be slightly polarized itself. In such a case,
the above conditions reduce to
1√
1 + 2α
<
pi
piE
< min
{
1
2
√
α
,
1√
1− 2α
}
. (38)
43There exist intermediate bargaining protocols for the two- or three-party bargaining problem, respectively. How-
ever, the exact details of the bargaining procedure are not crucial for our results, provided that they do not reverse
the voters’ preference orderings.
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Hence, party preferences are polarized in two orthogonal dimensions with a similar degree. If the degree
of polarization were very unequal, i.e. Condition (38) did not hold, there would be no room for fruitful
negotiations between a conventional party and the extreme party. For instance, a conventional party would
never accept installing a dictatorship, if the latter were backed by an extreme party. As mentioned in the
main text, we can think of d¯ as the closest policy to the status quo in D that is acceptable for party E,
although it need not be its ideal policy in this dimension.
A.6
B Appendix: CPCs without Exclusion Rule and Welfare
(Supplementary Material)
In this appendix we do two things. First, we study how the one-party exclusion rules affects our results
by characterizing the equilibria of game G+ when the one-party exclusion rule does not apply. Second, we
prove Theorems 3 and 4 regarding welfare.
Accordingly, we start analyzing the case where parties can write arbitrary CPCs. More specifically, we
show that under RC and rational expectations, the equilibria of game G+ without the one-party exclusion
rule depend on the relation between q, qn, qc, and 12 when conventional parties may play weakly dominated
strategies. We present the different cases in Tables 9–11. Note that RC implies Condition (20), which can
be rewritten as
qc ≤ 1
2
. (39)
We shall focus on the draft of CPCs. From Stage 2 onwards, the equilibrium dynamics will be the same
as with the one-party exclusion rule, except when all coalitions are excluded (as this case could not occur
with the one-party exclusion rule). It will suffice to assume that policies are still determined by f(·, ·, ·, ·),
a mapping that in this case is based on the corresponding extension of Table 2—see Table 8 below.
(σK , σKˆ)
(σl, σr)
(R,R) (R,L) & (L,R) (L,L)
(∅, ∅)
pR (R)
pE (RE/LE)
pL (L)
(∅, {K})
({Kˆ}, {K})
(∅, {E})
pKE (KE)
({Kˆ}, {E})
({E}, {E}) pLR (LR)
({Kˆ, E}, {E})
pK (K)({E}, {K,E})
({Kˆ, E}, {K,E})
Table 8: Policy implemented without the one-party exclusion rule and government coalition (in parenthe-
ses).
We distinguish three cases:
Case I: SC2A
All CPCs that may be written in equilibrium in this case are summarized in Table 9.
Case II: SC2B and qn < 12
All CPCs that may be written in equilibrium in this case are summarized in Table 10.
Case III: SC2B and qn ≥ 12
All CPCs that may be written in equilibrium in this case are summarized in Table 11.
We note that, in all cases, if q is large enough, two different equilibria may arise: one in which any coalition
with the extreme party is precluded, and another in which all coalitions are precluded. By definition, this
latter equilibrium cannot arise if the one-party exclusion rule is in place.
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0 ≤ q < qn qn ≤ q < qc qc ≤ q < 1
2
1
2
≤ q ≤ 1
(∅, ∅)
(∅, {E})
({E}, ∅)
({R,E}, ∅)
(∅, {L,E})
({E}, {E})
({R,E}, ∅)
(∅, {L,E})
({E}, {E})
({R,E}, {L,E})
Table 9: CPCs under SC2A without the one-party exclusion rule.
0 ≤ q < qc qc ≤ q < qn qn ≤ q < 1
2
1
2
≤ q ≤ 1
(∅, ∅) (∅, ∅)
({E}, {E})
({E}, {E})
({R,E}, ∅)
(∅, {L,E})
({E}, {E})
({R,E}, {L,E})
Table 10: CPCs under SC2B and qn < 12 without the one-party exclusion rule.
0 ≤ q < qn qn ≤ q < 1
2
1
2
≤ q < qn qn ≤ q ≤ 1
(∅, ∅) (∅, ∅)
({E}, {E})
(∅, ∅)
({E}, {E})
({R,E}, {L,E})
({E}, {E})
({R,E}, {L,E})
Table 11: CPCs under SC2B and qn ≥ 12 without the one-party exclusion rule.
In what is left of this appendix, we analyze the welfare implications of CPCs. Before we do so, it is useful
to show by means of an example that welfare functions that satisfy Condition (21) can be defined in a
standard way. This will allow to discuss the extent of the restrictions imposed by such a condition.
Example 1
Let us consider a utilitarian approach which only takes voters (and not parties) into account. Then, we
need to specify two additional elements: (i) the extreme voters’ utility function, namely ve(·), and (ii) the
population share αk that voter k ∈ {l, r, e} represents, with αl + αr + αe = 1. Utilitarian welfare is then
given as follows:
W u(p) = αl · vl(p) + αr · vr(p) + αe · ve(p).
Under the equivalence of Conditions (14)–(16) for the voters’ utilites and assuming that pE is voter e’s
preferred policy, we obtain that Condition (21) holds for W u(·) if and only if
vk(pLR)− vk(pE)
ve(pE)− ve(pLR) >
αe
1− αe for k ∈ {l, r}.
Hence, it is sufficient that the share of extreme voters be not too large for Condition (21) to be satisfied.
Accordingly, we are now in a position to prove Theorem 3 (about welfare in the ex-ante case) and state
and prove Theorem 4 (about welfare in the interim case).
Proof of Theorem 3:
Throughout the proof, we use WCPC to denote welfare with the possibility of writing CPC and WNCPC
to denote welfare without such a possibility. We prove each item of the theorem sequentially. First, Parts
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(a) and (b) follow immediately from expressions (18) and (19) respectively. On the one hand, assume that
SC2B holds. Then,44
EH [WCPC ]− EH [WNCPC ] = H(qc) · [W (pE)−W (pE)]
+ (H(qn)−H(qc)) ·
[
1
2
W (pLR) +
1
2
W (pE)−W (pE)
]
+ (1−H(qn)) · [W (pLR)−W (pE)]
=
(
1−H(qn) + 1
2
(H(qn)−H(qc))
)
· [W (pLR)−W (pE)] > 0, (40)
where the inequality holds due to Condition (21). On the other hand, assume that SC2A holds. Then,
EH [WCPC ]− EH [WNCPC ] = H(qn) [W (pE)−W (pE)]
+ (H(qc)−H(qn)) ·
[∫ qc
qn
(
1
2
(qW (pL) + (1− q)W (pR)) + 1
2
((1− q)W (pL) + qW (pR))−W (pE)
)]
+(1−H(qc)) [W (pLR)−W (pE)]
=H(qn) [W (pE)−W (pE)] + (H(qc)−H(qn)) ·
[
1
2
W (pL) +
1
2
·W (pR)−W (pE)
]
+(1−H(qc)) [W (pLR)−W (pE)] > 0, (41)
where the inequality holds due to Conditions (21) and (22). We note that when qn < q < qc, we have
assumed that with probability 12 party L will exclude E and with probability
1
2 party R will exclude E.
45
While, conditional on the first case, coordination on R occurs with probability q and coordination on L
with probability 1− q, for the second case the conditional probabilities are reversed. It is then a matter of
simple algebra to check that these observations yield the result that the occurrence of policy pL and policy
pR each has a probability of
1
2 .
Second, to prove Part (c) it suffices to observe that, if B = 2b and K ∈ {L,R},
lim
b→∞
qc = lim
b→∞
b+ VK(pK)− VK(pLR)
2b+ VK(pK)− VK(pKˆ)
=
1
2
, (42)
and
lim
b→∞
qn = lim
b→∞
b+ VK(pE)− VK(pKˆ)
2b+ VK(pK)− VK(pKˆ)
=
1
2
, (43)
Third and last, Part (d) follows from Tables 9, 10, and 11. When the one-party exclusion rule does not
apply and B = 2b, we obtain46
lim
b→∞
EH [WCPC ]− EH [WNCPC ]
=
1−H (12)
2
· [W (pLR)−W (pE)] +
1−H (12)
2
·
[
1
2
W (pL) +
1
2
W (pR)−W (pE)
]
.
The sign of the above expression may be positive or negative, provided that Condition (22) does not hold.
2
The interpretation of the theorem below is similar to that of Theorem 3.
44We have assumed that whenever there are two equilibria, both will occur with the same probability. This
assumption does not qualitatively affect our results. Further, recall that H(·) denotes the cumulative distribution
function of q.
45If the two probabilities differ, Condition (22) can be replaced by Condition (23).
46We have assumed that whenever there are two equilibria, both will occur with the same probability. This
assumption does not qualitatively affect our results.
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Theorem 4
Under SC1 we obtain the following results:
(a) CPCs with the one-party exclusion rule are weakly interim welfare-improving when SC2B holds.
(b) CPCs with the one-party exclusion rule are weakly interim welfare-improving when SC2A holds if
Condition (23) also holds.
Moreover, assume that Condition (2) holds tight, i.e. B = 2b. Then
(c) CPCs with the one-party exclusion rule are interim welfare-improving if b is large enough and q > 12 .
(d) CPCs without the one-party exclusion rule may not be interim weakly welfare-improving even if b is
arbitrarily large and q > 12 .
Proof:
As in the proof of Theorem 3, we use WCPC to denote welfare with CPCs and WNCPC to denote welfare
without CPC, and we prove each item of the theorem sequentially. First, Parts (a) and (b) follow from
expressions (18) and (19) respectively. On the one hand, assume that SC2B holds. Then,
WCPC −WNCPC =

0 if 0 ≤ q < qc,
0 or W (pLR)−W (pE) if qc ≤ q < qn,
W (pLR)−W (pE) if qn ≤ q ≤ 1.
(44)
Due to Condition (21), none of the above cases yields a negative sign. On the other hand, assume that
SC2A holds. Then,
WCPC −WNCPC =

0 if 0 ≤ q < qn,
W (pR)−W (pE) or W (pL)−W (pE) if qn ≤ q < qc,
W (pLR)−W (pE) if qc ≤ q ≤ 1.
(45)
Due to Conditions (21) and (23), none of the above cases yield a negative sign. Second, to prove Part (c)
it suffices to observe that, if B = 2b,
lim
b→∞
qc = lim
b→∞
qn =
1
2
.
Third and last, Part (d) follows from Tables 9, 10, and 11. When the one-party exclusion rule does not
apply, B = 2b, and q > 12 , we obtain either
lim
b→∞
WCPC −WNCPC =W (pLR)−W (pE) > 0
or
lim
b→∞
WCPC −WNCPC = W (pK)−W (pE),
with K ∈ {L,R}. When Condition (23) does not hold the latter expression could be negative for at least
one conventional party K.
2
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If q > 12 , writing a CPC makes it more likely for a conventional party to receive the coordinated votes of
the conventional voters. A more detailed look at the findings of the previous sections reveals further results
regarding interim welfare. First, not only CPCs are quite often weakly interim welfare-improving but in
many cases they yield policy pLR whenever each conventional party excludes the extreme party. Such a
policy may be the first-best outcome if conventional voters are not very partisan. Under our assumptions
on parties’ and voters’ preferences, first-best outcomes are never attainable without CPCs. Second, if
qc, qn < 12 , then CPCs with the one-party exclusion rule yield pLR, even in cases where the probability of
voters coordinating on the sole party that has excluded E, i.e. q, is lower than a half.
B.5
C Appendix: Extensions (Supplementary Material)
In this appendix we reconsider some of the assumptions made in the main body of the paper and check
whether our conclusions remain valid, at least qualitatively. We study several variations, the sole condition
being that we only change one feature of the model at a time.
1. We consider two extreme parties, E1 and E2, instead of just one.
2. We relax the assumption of rational expectations, i.e. qL and qR might be different.
3. We consider a continuum of voters.
4. A difference between conventional parties is introduced by allowing their corresponding ideal points
not to be symmetrically located with respect to the policy a grand coalition would implement.
5. We introduce uncertainty with respect to the share of the electorate represented by the extreme voter
e.
6. We limit the power of party E in its bilateral negotiations with conventional parties by constraining
the offers acceptable for those parties.
7. We consider the case where the ability of the governing coalition to distribute perks increases with
its parliamentary support, as does the voters’ disutility from perks.
8. We analyze the long-term costs and benefits of CPCs for parties and society when more than one
election is considered.
C.1 Multiple extreme parties
As in most parliamentary democracies there are several extreme parties trying to enter parliament, it is
informative to examine the situation with more than one such party. This case is also interesting because
even if there is only one extreme party and CPCs were in place, the extreme party might have an incentive
to split into two or more parties to bypass the effect of CPCs—especially under the one-party exclusion
rule.
We stay within the setup of the main body of the paper, the only modification being that we now consider
two extreme parties, E1 and E2, instead of just one. The two extreme parties pursue an implementation
of shifts in policy dimensions D1 = {0, d¯1} and D2 = {0, d¯2} respectively, with 0 denoting the status quo
in these dimensions, respectively. Both D1 and D2 are orthogonal to T . If D1 = D2, both extreme parties
aim for the same shift. If D1 6= D2, they aim for shifts in orthogonal dimensions. We also assume that each
extreme party obtains the same share of the votes in the election, so that a coalition with either of them
would be sufficient to form a government.47 Note that if one extreme party had a higher share than the
other one, the extreme party with the lowest share would be irrelevant in the model, as this extreme party
would not be able to form a majority with a conventional party. In that case, the analysis set out in the
main body of the paper would still be valid.
As in the case of one extreme party only, we will say that an extreme party possesses strong bargaining power
if neither conventional party has excluded it in its CPC. By contrast, we will say that an extreme party
possesses weak bargaining power if exactly one conventional party has excluded it in its CPC. We let both
extreme parties be identical in the following senses: First, a coalition government formed by a conventional
47To remain strictly within the setup of Section 3, we assume that the extreme voter is able to split his vote. In
the case where each conventional party attempts to form a coalition with one extreme party, each coalition has a
probability of 1/2 for forming the government.
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party and extreme party EJ (J = 1, 2) with strong bargaining power will implement policy pEJ . Second, a
coalition government formed by a conventional party and one extreme party with weak bargaining power
will implement policy pKEJ . Preferences of parties and voters carry over from the baseline setup to this new
setting. In addition, each conventional party and each conventional voter dislikes d¯1 and d¯2 equally. This
latter observation will enable us to simplify (and slightly abuse) notation and denote D = D1 = D2 = {0, d¯},
while keeping in mind that extreme parties E1 and E2 will either act together (when d¯1 = d¯2) or compete
against each other (when d¯1 6= d¯2). In particular, we also set pE = pE1 = pE2 and pKE = pKE1 = pKE2 , as
such policies yield the same utilities for conventional parties and voters, respectively.
For the analysis of this modified setup, we need to specify the outcome at the government formation stage
when one conventional party, say K, has excluded one of the extreme parties, say E1, while the other
conventional party, Kˆ, has excluded neither E1 nor E2. First, if d¯1 = d¯2, extreme party E1 will walk
away from any negotiations, thereby granting E2 strong bargaining power in the negotiations with the
conventional parties as both extreme parties have common interests. Second, consider d¯1 6= d¯2. In this
case, if no conventional party has received a majority of votes, there will be competition regarding a coalition
with E2, and that competition will grant E2 strong bargaining power. Hence, if E2 forms a government
coalition with one conventional party, it will implement policy pE . This can be justified similarly to the
case of only one extreme party since conventional parties compete head to head to form a coalition with
this extreme party. By contrast, as E1 will only be able to form a coalition government with party Kˆ if E1
forms a government coalition with conventional party Kˆ, it will implement policy pKˆE .
Whether a coalition government will form with E1 or with E2 will depend on the particular bargaining
protocol between the four parties, which admits of no unique, obvious solution. We shall use blue to
indicate the protocol where a coalition with the extreme party possessing strong bargaining power will be
formed, and green to indicate the other possibility, where the extreme party with weak bargaining power
becomes part of the government. By allowing both possible outcomes, we avoid having to impose more
structure on voter and party preferences. To sum up, in the case where no party has received a majority of
votes, we consider the following two possibilities:
[
σK = {E1} and σKˆ = ∅
]⇒ {Kˆ or K and E2 form the government, and pE is chosen (blue protocol),
Kˆ and E1 form the government, and pKˆE is chosen (green protocol).
Given the conventional voters’ preferences (recall Section 3) and the assumption that voters can observe
CPCs and anticipate their effect on the policies eventually carried out by the government, we find that the
election outcome will lead to the following policy choices:[
σK = {E1} and σKˆ = ∅
]⇒{
pE is chosen (blue protocol).
pK is chosen with prob. q and pKˆ is chosen with prob. 1− q (green protocol).
(46)
In Expression (46) we have assumed that coordination on one conventional party from the side of the
conventional voters will be prompted by the signal of Stage 2 with probability q in favor of the conventional
party that excluded a larger number of extreme parties, if any.
The object of this section is to characterize the equilibrium outcomes under the above assumptions when
CPCs are available. We shall assume throughout SC1, RC, rational expectations, and that parties do not use
weakly dominated strategies. It is worth making the following two additional remarks: First, at the election
stage of the game, conventional voters will coordinate on one of the conventional parties if the outcome
under sincere voting is either policy pKE , with K ∈ {L,R}, or a caretaker government implementing pct.
Second, given that RC implies that qc ≤ 12 , if parties do not use weakly dominated strategies, we can use
the table below to describe the game at the first stage when the conventional parties sign their contracts.
Recall that for x ∈ [0, 1], we denote V xK(p1, p2) = x · VK(p1) + (1− x) · VK(p2), where p1, p2 ∈ P, while BxK
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is such that BxL = B · x and BxR = B · (1− x). A strategy for party K now selects a subset of {E1, E2, Kˆ}.
Lastly, Table 12 below contains the parties’ contract choice game for both possible bargaining protocols.
∅ {E1} {E2} {E1, E2}
∅ B2 + VK(pE)
B
2 + VK(pE)
B1−qK + V
1−q
K (pL, pR)
B
2 + VK(pE)
B1−qK + V
1−q
K (pL, pR)
B1−qK + V
1−q
K (pL, pR)
{E1}
B
2 + VK(pE)
BqK + V
q
K(pL, pR)
B
2 + VK(pE)
B
2 + V
1
2
K (pL, pR) B
1−q
K + V
1−q
K (pL, pR)
{E2}
B
2 + VK(pE)
BqK + V
q
K(pL, pR)
B
2 + V
1
2
K (pL, pR)
B
2 + VK(pE) B
1−q
K + V
1−q
K (pL, pR)
{E1, E2} BqK + V qK(pL, pR) BqK + V qK(pL, pR) BqK + V qK(pL, pR) b+ VK(pLR)
Table 12: Conventional parties’ contract choice game with two extreme parties. Row player is party L and
column player is party R.
Note that we have written only those strategies that are payoff-different and have omitted all the strategies
that are weakly dominated for both bargaining protocols. Indeed, let h ∈ {1, 2}. Then, it is easy to verify
that for party K the following pairs of strategies are payoff-equivalent: {Kˆ} and ∅, {Eh} and {Kˆ, Eh},
{E1, E2}, and {Kˆ, E1, E2}. Moreover, {Kˆ, E1, E2} is weakly dominated by {E1, E2}. We stress that, as in
the case of only one extreme party, Table 12 is also obtained if we allow parties to use weakly dominated
strategies but impose instead a two-party exclusion rule: i.e. in a CPC, each party can only exclude a
coalition containing two other parties at the most. As a tie-breaking rule, we assume that conventional
parties prefer to exclude extreme parties and not to exclude the other conventional party. Lastly, we note
that in V xk (pL, pR) the parameter q now denotes the probability of conventional voters coordinating their
votes on the conventional party that has excluded a larger number of extreme parties in its CPC. If both
conventional parties have excluded the same number of extreme parties, we assume that the coordination
probability for both parties is a half.
The characterization of equilibria depending on the parties’ perceived coordination probability q can be
found in Appendix D. Here we state the main results regarding the welfare implications of CPCs in this
modified framework in the light of the results from the setup with only one extreme party. The proposition
below follows from the analysis contained in the aforementioned appendix and is proved therein. By default,
we assume that no rule limits the maximum number of parties to be precluded in a CPC.
Proposition 3
Consider the framework with two extreme parties of equal size, and assume SC1, RC, rational expectations,
and that parties do not use weakly dominated strategies. Then we obtain the following results:
(a) CPCs are ex-ante welfare-improving under both protocols (blue and green) if Condition (22) holds.
(b) Assume that B = 2b. Then, if b is large enough, ex-ante welfare with the blue protocol is higher than
ex-ante welfare with the green protocol if and only if Condition (22) holds.
(c) CPCs are interim welfare-improving under both protocols if b is large enough and q > 12 .
(d) CPCs with the one-party exclusion rule always yield worse outcomes than without the one-party
exclusion rule. Moreover, if the reverse of Condition (22) holds, CPCs with the one-party exclusion
rule are (ex-ante and interim) welfare-decreasing.
In the basic setup with only one extreme party, we saw that the simple one-party exclusion rule was sufficient
to prevent any equilibrium in which all coalitions are ruled out. In that setting, the same outcomes were
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reached without the one-party exclusion rule if conventional parties played no weakly dominated strategies.
In the case with two extreme parties, we can specify a two-party exclusion rule, or, equivalently, assume
that no conventional party will play a weakly dominated strategy. Limiting the number of parties that may
be excluded could give parties an incentive to split into two or more parties to relax the constraints imposed
by CPCs and still be able to be part of a government coalition albeit under a different party name. But
parties typically have to register some time before the election. After registration, the maximum number
of parties to be excluded in a contract is fixed, and an exclusion rule based on that number cannot be
bypassed by party splitting.48
C.2 No rational expectations
Next we assume that parties’ beliefs on voter coordination may not be rational, i.e., qR = qL need not hold,
so the expected impact of CPCs on vote coordination is different for both conventional parties. Throughout
this subsection, we assume SC1 and that the one-party exclusion rule is in place. As for the baseline model
with rational expectations, it can be shown that signing a CPC excluding E given that Kˆ has excluded E
is only profitable ex-ante for K if
qK ≥ (B − b) + VK(pK)− VK(pLR)
B + VK(pK)− VK(pKˆ)
≡ qcK = qc. (47)
Similarly, given that conventional party Kˆ does not sign a CPC, we obtain the following condition for
party K to exclude the extreme party from a coalition:
qK ≥
B
2 + VK(pE)− VK(pKˆ)
B + VK(pK)− VK(pKˆ)
≡ qnK = qn. (48)
For a complete characterization of the equilibria, the relations between qnK and q
c
K , with K ∈ {L,R}, play
a crucial role. We distinguish two cases depending on the latter relation. First, we assume SC2A. Figure 3
contains the equilibria outcomes when SC2A holds.
For coordination beliefs (qL, qR) such that (qL, qR) ∈ QE,∅ ∪Q∅,E , where QE,∅ = [qn, 1]× [0, qn) ∪ [qc, 1]×
[qn, qc) and Q∅,E = [0, qn) × [qn, 1] ∪ [qn, qc) × [qc, 1], there is a unique equilibrium which is asymmetric
and where one conventional party excludes E and conventional voters coordinate their votes on one of the
parties as described by the following strategy profiles:
(σL, σR) =
 ({E}, ∅) if (qL, qR) ∈ QE,∅,(∅, {E}) if (qL, qR) ∈ Q∅,E .
Moreover, when (qL, qR) ∈ Qmult ≡ [qn, qc)× [qn, qc) both asymmetric contract choices are the only equilib-
ria. All in all, asymmetric equilibria may occur simply because conventional parties have different beliefs.
Second, we assume SC2B. Figure 4 contains the equilibria outcomes when SC2B holds.
Now the area where asymmetric CPCs are chosen reduces to QE,∅ := [qn, 1]× [0, qc) and Q∅,E := [0, qc)×
[qn, 1], while in the area Qmult := [q
c, qn)× [qc, qn) both symmetric contract choices are feasible in equilib-
rium. Note that rational belief equilibria are again indicated by the bisectrix in Figure 4.
We also analyze the welfare implications of CPCs when we do not impose the rational expectations as-
sumption. To that end, we assume that (qL, qR) is distributed on [0, 1]× [0, 1] and that the exact value of
48A law should not be based on the identity of parties. Hence, from a legal point of view an “extreme” party is
no different from a conventional party except for its share. However, in a political system with two well-established
conventional parties, the number of extreme parties is η − 2, where η is the total number of parties. A law could
therefore be based on η.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium outcomes depending on parties’ beliefs about voter coordination under SC2A.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium outcomes depending on parties’ beliefs about voter coordination under SC2B.
the true probability of how voters coordinate, q, is not known by the conventional parties before they write
the contracts. Hence, we should now consider the whole area in Figures 3 and 4 instead of the bisectrix.
Particularly relevant is the following fact: even if B = 2b and b is arbitrarily large (which implies qc, qn ' 12),
there are regions in which asymmetric equilibria occur. These regions cover those circumstances in which
both conventional parties believe that being the sole party excluding E only benefits coordination on that
party for one of the conventional parties.
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C.3 A continuum of voters
In the baseline model we have assumed that conventional voters l and r represent a share of voters that
are inclined towards parties L and R, respectively, but who might consider voting for the other party for
strategic reasons. In the same vein, we have assumed that e represents the share of voters willing to vote
for party E unconditionally. These assumptions have simplified our analysis of the implications of CPCs on
policies and welfare by enabling us to leave out of account issues like vote miscoordination and to place the
focus on the interaction implications among parties on the one hand, and between parties and voters on the
other. However, to what extent do our conclusions from the previous sections depend on the assumption
that there are two conventional voters—and one extreme voter—instead of many more voters?
To answer this question, we modify our political games (G− without CPCs and G+ with CPCs) and assume
that there is a continuum of voters, say [0, 1], with each of them casting a single vote in the election. We
consider proportional elections, i.e. the number of seats a party obtains in parliament is proportional to
its vote share. As already mentioned, the assumption that allocation of cabinet portfolios in parliamentary
democracies is proportional to the legislative seat shares of the governing parties is called Gamson’s Law
(Gamson, 1961). We assume that this principle applies to the negotiations between conventional parties
but not to the ones between a conventional party and the extreme party.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the share of extreme voters, αE , is lower than
1
3 and is common
knowledge and that the extreme voters are uniformly distributed among [0, 1] and will always vote for
party E.49 Let Ω ( [0, 1] denote the set of conventional voters. Considering a continuum of (conventional)
voters has the following immediate consequence: The range of the vote share of parties L and R is broad.
To deal with this fact, we will assume it to be common knowledge that in a grand coalition, conventional
parties will receive a utility from perks that is proportional to their share and that the policy implemented
by such a government will be the policy p = (t, d) ∈ T × D, with T ( R and D = {0, d¯}, that maximizes50
αL · VL(p) + αR · VR(p). (49)
Note that we have assumed—and we will assume throughout this section—that B = 2b, where b denotes
the utility derived from perks that each conventional party obtains in the grand coalition when both
conventional parties have the same vote share.51 Hence, conventional parties will be indifferent between the
perks obtained in a grand coalition—with equal-size parties—and the expected perks obtained by each of
them in a situation where either coalition between a conventional party and the extreme party may occur
with probability of 12 .
For this modified setting, a strategy profile will be a combination of CPCs (for the parties) and voting
strategies (for the voters). We will refer to a profile of pure strategies as an equilibrium if
(a) voters vote according to the signal from the correlation device if and only if they find it profitable to
do so,
(b) for each subset of (conventional) voters, S ⊆ Ω, there exists no profile of strategies for voters in S
such that all of them obtain a larger utility by changing their strategies, provided that voters in Ω\S
do not change their strategies,
(c) given (a) and (b), strategies are subgame perfect.
49The assumption that extreme voters always vote for party E can be justified as in Sections 3 and 4. The notion
of extreme voters is used to describe the preferences of a minority that desires a discontinuous and large change of
the status quo against more than two-thirds of the electorate.
50This bargaining procedure yields the Nash Bargaining solution with bargaining power proportional to the share
in parliament.
51This assumption has no qualitative effect on our results.
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As in the baseline model, voters care about the policy p = (t, d) implemented and derive a disutility from
the (constant) level of perks received by members of the government. Conventional voter i’s utility is
single-peaked, with (ti, di) ∈ T ×D denoting his ideal policy. To simplify the exposition, we assume in the
following that for each conventional voter i ∈ Ω and every policy p = (t, d) ∈ T × D,
Vi((t, d), B) = ui(|t− ti|)− d−B,
where ui(·) = u(·) and u(·) is decreasing and concave. In particular, {ui (|t− ti|)}i∈Ω satisfies the strong
single-crossing property, which means that for all i, j ∈ Ω such that ti < tj and t, t′ ∈ T with t < t′, we
have, for each x ≥ 0,
(a) ui(|t′ − ti|)− ui(|t− ti|) > x⇒ uj(|t′ − tj |)− uj(|t− tj |) > x,
(b) uj(|t− tj |)− uj(|t′ − tj |) > x⇒ ui(|t− ti|)− ui(|t′ − ti|) > x.
Although we do not explicitly express it, we will also assume that voters obtain an extra disutility when they
vote strategically. The factor behind this assumption is the tension between sincere voting and strategic
voting (see e.g. Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988; Austen-Smith, 1989). Whereas under sincere voting voters
are assumed to take only ideological information—i.e., parties’ ideal points—into account when casting
their vote, under strategic voting voters care about eventual policy outcomes, so their beliefs about the
probability that they are pivotal will influence their vote. We assume the existence of the so-called ideological
burden of voting strategically, which lowers (albeit perhaps very slightly) utility for a citizen when he votes
strategically, i.e., when he votes for a party whose ideal point is not the closest to his own. The larger
the burden of voting strategically is for a voter, the more likely it is that he votes sincerely, i.e., for the
party whose ideal point is closest to his ideal point. We assume that the ideological burden for extreme
voters is very large, as they are committed to the single issue of the extreme party. Hence, as already
mentioned, they will always vote for the extreme party. By contrast, we assume that such a burden is small
for conventional voters i, with i ∈ [0, 1], and that it is decreasing in the distance between their ideal point
pi = (ti, 0) and the ideal point of the median voter m in dimension T , pm := (tm, 0). Beyond assuming that
tL < tm < tR, consider that
tm − tL = tR − tm. (50)
While tL < tm < tR ensures that the ideal points of conventional parties are on opposite sides of the distri-
bution {ti}i∈Ω, Condition (50) requires those ideal points to be symmetric with respect to tm. Accordingly,
party L (or R) can be called the left-wing (or right-wing) party. Lastly, for notational convenience we
introduce, for each voter i ∈ Ω, the set
F i := {j ∈ Ω | ti < tj} , (51)
which consists of all conventional voters with an ideal point larger than ti.
52 We use the operator | · | to
denote the measure of a set. Then we can denote by l the conventional voter such that F l is minimal with
respect to inclusion among the sets F i as defined in (51), where i is a conventional voter, with the property
that |F i ∪ {i}| ≥ 12 . That is, l is the conventional voter i with the largest ti such that all conventional
voters j with tj ≥ ti account for at least half of the population. Analogously, we define r such that Ω\Fr is
minimal with respect to inclusion among the sets Ω \ F i where i is a conventional voter, with the property
that |Ω\F i| ≥ 12 . That is, r is the conventional voter i with the smallest ti such that all conventional voters
j with tj ≤ ti account for at least half of the population. Since |Ω| = 1 − αE < 1, the sets F l and Fr do
not overlap.
Figure 5 illustrates all the previous results and definitions graphically. The following result reveals that in
our framework there is no loss of generality in assuming that there are only two conventional voters, namely
l and r.
52To ensure that all concepts are well-defined, we assume that ti 6= tj for all i, j ∈ Ω with i 6= j.
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Figure 5: The critical voters.
Proposition 4
(a) All extreme voters and all conventional voters in
[
Ω \ (F l ∪ {l})] ∪ Fr vote sincerely.
(b) All conventional voters in F l \ [Fm ∪m] cast the same vote as l.
(c) All conventional voters in Fm \ Fr cast the same vote as r.
Proof:
First, we stress that the outcome of the election depends only on the shares of the conventional parties,
namely αL and αR. Therefore, since we are considering Strong Nash equilibria and there is a positive cost
for voting strategically, the set of voters who vote strategically, denoted by S∗, will be such that either
S∗ ⊂ Fm or S∗ ⊂ Ω \ Fm, and either |S∗| = 0 or |S∗| = 12αE . That is, only a minimal share of voters will
vote strategically. These voters will suffice to change the outcome of the election.
Second, as the above observation suggests, there may be different sets S∗ that would lead to the same
voting outcome. However, according to our notion of equilibrium, it will necessarily be the case that when
S∗ is non-empty, it will consist of the subset of measure αE2 of conventional voters with ideal points closest
to tm. This statement follows from two facts. On the one hand, in the policy dimension T agents have
preferences that satisfy the strong single-crossing property. Thus, if a conventional voter has no incentive
to deviate from sincere voting, no other conventional voter on his political side who is farther away from
the median will either. On the other hand, the closer a conventional voter’s ideal point ti is to tm, the less
he will suffer from the policy shift toward the ideal point of his least preferred conventional party.
2
Hence, l and r are critical voters in the sense that it is their vote that determines the outcome of the
election. From Proposition 4 we immediately obtain the main result in this section.
Proposition 5
A strategy profile in the political game with a continuum of agents is an equilibrium if and only if the
strategy profile of parties and critical voters is an equilibrium in game G+ (or G−) and the strategy profile
fulfills Proposition 4.
As a consequence, the welfare implications of CPCs derived for the baseline model with three voters carry
over to this more micro-founded model. Finally, we also stress that the conditions on the preferences of the
conventional voters in the baseline model can be translated into the modified setting with a continuum of
voters by adapting them to conditions on the preferences of the critical voters l and r.
C.8
C.4 Asymmetric ideal points for conventional parties
Let us now assume that conventional parties’ ideal points, pL and pR, are not located symmetrically with
respect to pLR. Let us further assume that this implies that, under sincere voting, there will always be
a unique conventional party, say L, with the higher share of votes. In a setting with many voters, this
would occur because more than half of the conventional voters’ ideal points would be closer to party L’s
ideal point than to party R’s ideal point. To remain within our baseline setting with only three voters, it
will be sufficient to assume different and positive weights for each party. When the asymmetry between
conventional parties’ vote share under sincere voting is so large that party L will obtain a vote share larger
than 12 , this party would obtain a majority in parliament. In this latter case, either with or without CPC,
a single-party government by L would be formed to implement its ideal point.
In all other cases, the effect of CPCs on the outcome of the elections is not so clear-cut, since both
conventional parties are interested in forming a coalition with the extreme party in Stage 4. Observe that
the larger the share of party L is with respect to party R under sincere voting, the “easier” it would be
for voters to coordinate on L rather than R, for in the former case a smaller number of voters would be
required to vote strategically.53 As a consequence, we should not expect the probability q of coordinating on
the only party that excludes E to be independent of which conventional party does so, even under rational
expectations. This requires a complete analysis.
For K ∈ {L,R}, let xK denote the probability that coordination occurs in favor of K when σK = {E}
and σKˆ = ∅. We assume that xR and xL are common knowledge among the two conventional parties. We
summarize the contract choice game played by the conventional parties with the one-party exclusion rule
in the following table. Recall that BxK is such that B
x
L = B · x and BxR = B · (1− x) for x ∈ [0, 1].
∅ {E}
∅ B
2
+ VK(pE) B
1−xR
K + (1− xR) · VK(pL) + xR · VK(pR)
{E} BxLK + xL · VK(pL) + (1− xL) · VK(pR) bK + VK(pLR)
Table 13: Conventional parties’ contract choice game under asymmetric ideal points for the conventional
parties. Row player is party L and column player is party R.
We note that now bK denotes the utility that party K derives from perks in a grand-coalition government
when all voters vote sincerely. We assume that
B + VK(pE) > bK + VK(pLR).
This inequality adapts Condition (5) to this modified setting.
Analogously to the analysis in Subsection C.2, we can identify four relevant critical values. As a tie-breaking
rule, we assume that parties will always exclude E. For K ∈ {L,R}, let
xn
Kˆ
:=
B
2 + VK(pE)− VK(pKˆ)
B + VK(pK)− VK(pKˆ)
and xc
Kˆ
:=
(B − b) + VK(pK)− VK(pLR)
B + VK(pK)− VK(pKˆ)
.
That is, given that party Kˆ has not excluded E, party K will prefer to exclude E if and only if xK ≥ xnKˆ ,
whereas given that party Kˆ has excluded E, party K will prefer to exclude E if and only if xKˆ ≥ xcKˆ . Note
that xn
Kˆ
= qnK and x
c
Kˆ
= qcK .
Under SC1 we can define xn := xnL = x
n
R and x
c := xcL = x
c
R. There are two possible cases that lead to
different equilibria in the choice game defined in Table 13.
53A symmetric argument could be carried out for the opposite case.
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Case I:54 xn < xc
Figure 6 contains the equilibrium outcomes in this case.
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Figure 6: Equilibrium outcomes depending on parties’ beliefs about voter coordination under SC2A when
parties’ ideal points are not symmetric.
Case II:55 xc ≥ xn
Figure 7 contains the equilibrium outcomes in this case.
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Figure 7: Equilibrium outcomes depending on parties’ beliefs about voter coordination under SC2B when
parties’ ideal points are not symmetric.
In both Figures 6 and 7, there are two regions in which there exist no equilibria in pure strategies. This is
in sharp contrast with the equilibria in Section C.2. From the two figures we deduce, however, that as long
as the difference between xL and xR is not very significant—geometrically that means that we stay close
54In terms of the conditions on the parameters of the model, this case is equivalent to SC2A.
55In terms of the conditions on the parameters of the model, this case is equivalent to SC2B.
C.10
to the bisectrix—, the results concerning equilibria and welfare remain essentially the same as those in the
main body of the paper.
C.5 Uncertainty about the extreme party’s vote share
One of the assumptions of our model is that the share of the extreme party E is perfectly foreseeable. There
are many reasons why this could be the case, e.g. policy d might be an issue that is not subject to political
fluctuations with a public opinion that is stable over time. However, it is interesting to speculate about
the robustness of our results if the share of the extreme party is stochastic. A simple way of doing that
is to assume that, prior to the game, it is common knowledge that with probability piE ∈ (0, 1) party E
will get into the parliament with a share αE and with probability 1 − piE it will not reach the threshold
of votes needed to enter the parliament, resulting in zero share. If the extreme party stayed out of the
parliament, coordination on one of the conventional parties would result in a (super)majority for this party,
which would implement its ideal point with certainty. Therefore, if it is certain that E will not get any
seats in the parliament, no voter would find it profitable to vote strategically, so CPCs would have no effect.
In that event, the unique equilibria of the political game would consist of sincere voting and a single-party
government of either L or R (each with probability 12) to respectively implement pL or pR. Note that a
conventional party would be able to form a government with less than half the votes but with at least half
the seats in the parliament.
Under the uncertainty modeled by piE , however, voters would need to balance the expected benefits/costs of
coordinating on one conventional party when only one conventional party writes a CPC against the expected
benefits/costs of voting sincerely. In particular, there will exist a threshold pi∗E such that, if and only if
piE > pi
∗
E , conventional voters l and r—as critical voters—would still find it profitable to coordinate on one
conventional party if only one conventional party excludes E. Parties would anticipate voters’ behavior,
so all results would remain true when piE > pi
∗
E . That is, if the variance on party E’s share is small, the
conclusions regarding the impact of CPCs on welfare prevail.
C.6 Less power for the extreme party
Another important assumption of the paper is that, whereas conventional parties are free to accept any
possible bargaining outcome with other parties, the extreme party can only accept bargains that offer d¯.
We might also assume, however, the existence of ideological constraints on the mobility of conventional
parties. A polar case is to imagine that a conventional party can only accept d¯ in exchange for its ideal
point in the policy dimension T . That is to say that party E would never have strong bargaining power. In
such a case, given the conventional parties’ and voters’ preferences as outlined in Section 3, no government
coalition in which the extreme party is a member would form in equilibrium without CPCs.
C.7 Increasing perks
Throughout the paper, the amount of perks has been assumed to be exogenously fixed and independent of
the exact composition of the government. However, there seems to be widespread evidence that very large
parliamentary support for the government reduces opposition, not only at the political level but also at the
media level.56 With reduced opposition, parties in the government may be able to increase the amount of
perks they get. In anticipation of such behavior, voters might not grant a super-majority to parties in the
government. Nevertheless, as long as assumptions similar to those imposed on conventional parties’ and
56Because of the existing links between power and the media.
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voters’ preferences in Section 3 obtained the thrust of our results would not change. Note that, to model
varying levels of perks, we would need to extend the model to account for more than three voters.
C.8 Reputation effects
Elections are often considered a one-shot game, as they cannot be compared with each other. Candidates
may change, socioeconomic circumstances may be very different, etc. However, parties are institutions
that last for many years. In particular, they have long-term strategies. When more than one election is
considered, writing a CPC might have an effect on the reputation of a party’s commitment credibility. For
instance, voters might believe the party’s announcements more (or less) than before. To account for such
an extension formally, a dynamic model would be required.
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D Appendix: Full Analysis of the Case with Two Extreme
Parties (Supplementary Material)
This appendix offers a comprehensive analysis of the case with two extreme parties. In particular, it
contains the proofs of Section C.1 (see Appendix C). In the first part, we assume that there is no rule
limiting the number of parties that can be excluded via CPCs, and we characterize the equilibria depending
on the parties’ perceived coordination probability q = qL = qR in the game with two equally-sized extreme
parties and two symmetric conventional parties. In the second, part we impose a certain exclusion rule.
Without any such rule, the critical probabilities qc and qn defined in Section 3 are still useful in the extended
framework. In particular, it holds that
q ≥ qn ⇔ B
2
+ VK(pE) ≤ q · [B + VK(pK)] + (1− q) · VK(pKˆ)
⇔ VK(pE) + B
2
≤ q ·B + V qK(pK , pKˆ). (52)
and
q ≥ qc ⇔ b+ VK(pLR) ≥ (1− q) · [B + VK(pK)] + q · VK(pKˆ)
⇔ b+ VK(pLR) ≥ (1− q) ·B + V 1−qK (pK , pKˆ). (53)
With a larger number of parties than in the baseline setup we obtain more equilibria. However, not all
the different equilibria lead to different policy outcomes. As we are mainly interested in the latter, we
focus our attention on the resulting equilibrium policy outcomes given coordination probability q rather
than on the equilibrium strategies. In particular, we use (q · pK , (1− q) · pKˆ) to denote the outcome where
with probability q conventional party K will form a single-party government and with the complementary
probability party Kˆ will lead a single-party government of its own. In either case, the conventional party
in the government will derive utility from perks amounting to B.
We distinguish three cases, depending on the relation between qn, qc, and 12 . More specifically, we distinguish
the case where qc ≤ qn ≤ 12 (Case I), the case where qc ≤ 12 ≤ qn (Case II), and the case where qn ≤ qc ≤ 12
(Case III). Recall that because we are assuming RC (see Section 5), it must hold that qc < 12 .
57 Lastly,
to facilitate the understanding of the proof, we also note that
1
2
≥ qn ⇔ B
2
+ VK(pE) ≤ 1
2
· [B + VK(pK)] + 1
2
· VK(pKˆ)
⇔ VK(pE) + B
2
≤ B
2
+ V
1
2
K (pK , pKˆ)
⇔ VK(pE) + B
2
≤ B
2
+ V
1
2
K (pKˆ , pK) (54)
and that
1
2
≥ q ⇔ 1
2
≤ (1− q)⇔ 1
2
·B + V
1
2
K (pK , pKˆ) ≥ q ·B + V qK(pK , pKˆ)
⇔ 1
2
·B + V
1
2
K (pK , pKˆ) ≤ V 1−qK ·B + V1−q(pK , pKˆ). (55)
It turns out that for several parameter constellations, there will exist a multiplicity of equilibria. This is
relevant when computing welfare, since an assumption is needed on the likelihood of each of the equilibria.
By default, we make the same assumption as in the baseline model: each equilibrium is equally likely. Since
57As our main goal is to calculate welfare, which depends on variable q, we neglect the cases where q coincides
with either qc, qn, 1− qn, or 12 , as they are events with zero probability.
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not all equilibria lead to different outcomes, the latter assumption implies that some outcomes will be more
likely than others. In the analysis below we will only report equilibrium outcomes. Accordingly, when there
is more than one equilibrium, we express the relative frequency of each of them. More specifically, (×j)
will mean that the corresponding equilibrium outcome can occur in j times more constellations than the
equilibrium marked as (×1).
Case I: qc ≤ qn ≤ 12
All equilibrium policy outcomes for this case are summarized in Table 14:
0 < q < qc qc < q < qn qn < q < 1
2
1
2
< q < 1
Blue protocol (BP)
(
1
2
pL,
1
2
pR
) (1
2
pL,
1
2
pR
)
(×2)
pLR (×1)
(
1
2
pL,
1
2
pR
)
(×2)
pLR (×1)
pLR
Green protocol (GP) pE
pLR (×1)
pE (×1)
(qpL, (1− q)pR) (×2)
((1− q)pL, qpR) (×2)
pLR (×1)
pLR
Table 14: Green versus blue protocol in the case of two extreme parties (Case I).
To prove the results contained in Table 14, we distinguish several subcases:
Case I.1: 0 < q < qc
From 0 < q < qc ≤ qn ≤ 12 < 1− q and Equations (52)–(55) it follows that
q ·B + V qK(pK , pKˆ) <
B
2
+ VK(pE) ≤ B
2
+ V
1
2
K (pK , pKˆ) < (1− q) ·B + V 1−qK (pK , pKˆ) (56)
and
b+ VK(pLR) < (1− q) ·B + V 1−qK (pK , pKˆ). (57)
First, in the case of the blue bargaining protocol, it follows from (56) and (57) that the strategies ∅ and
{E1, E2} are weakly dominated for both conventional parties. Thus, the contract choice game for the
conventional parties in undominated strategies reduces to
Party L
Party R
{E1} {E2}
{E1} B2 + VL(pE), B2 + VR(pE) B2 + V
1
2
L (pL, pR),
B
2
+ V
1
2
R (pL, pR)
{E2} B2 + V
1
2
L (pL, pR),
B
2
+ V
1
2
R (pL, pR)
B
2
+ VL(pE),
B
2
+ VR(pE)
There are two equilibria, ({E1}, {E2}) and ({E2}, {E1}). Nevertheless, according to the voters’ preferences
and the fact that both extreme parties have weak bargaining power due to the contracts chosen by the
parties, the policy outcomes associated with both equilibria are the same, i.e.
(
1
2pL,
1
2pR
)
.
Second, in the case of the green bargaining protocol, it follows from (56) and (57) that strategy ∅ weakly
dominates any other strategy for both conventional parties. Thus there is only one equilibrium, (∅, ∅). In
this equilibrium, both extreme parties have strong bargaining power since no CPC has been chosen by the
parties. As a consequence, the policy outcome associated with this equilibrium is pE .
Case I.2: qc < q < qn
In this case, from Equations (52)–(55) it follows that (56) holds again, but
b+ VK(pLR) > (1− q) ·B + V 1−qK (pK , pKˆ). (58)
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On the one hand, in the case of the blue bargaining protocol, it can be verified that there are three equilibria:
({E1}, {E2}), ({E2}, {E1}), and ({E1, E2}, {E1, E2}). As in Case I.1, the policy outcomes associated with
the first two equilibria are the same, i.e.
(
1
2pL,
1
2pR
)
. Regarding the latter equilibria, however, the policy
outcome is pLR, as no extreme party can form a coalition with any of the conventional parties.
On the other hand, in the case of the green bargaining protocol, it can also be verified that there are
two equilibria, (∅, ∅) and ({E1, E2}, {E1, E2}). In the first equilibrium, both extreme parties have strong
bargaining power due to the contracts chosen by the parties, so the policy outcome associated with it is
pE . In the second equilibrium, the policy outcome is pLR, as no extreme party can form a coalition with
any of the conventional parties.
Case I.3: qn < q < 12
In this case, from Equations (52)–(55) it follows that
B
2
+ VK(pE) < q ·B + V qK(pK , pKˆ) <
B
2
+ V
1
2
K (pK , pKˆ) < (1− q) ·B + V 1−qK (pK , pKˆ)
and that (58) holds again.
On the one hand, in the case of the blue bargaining protocol it can be verified that the following are
the equilibria: ({E1}, {E2}), ({E2}, {E1}), and ({E1, E2}, {E1, E2}), which lead respectively to policies(
1
2pL,
1
2pR
)
,
(
1
2pL,
1
2pR
)
, and pLR.
On the other hand, in the case of the green bargaining protocol, it can be verified that there are five equi-
libria: ({E1}, ∅), ({E2}, ∅), (∅, {E1}), (∅, {E2}) and ({E1, E2}, {E1, E2}). The policy outcome associated
with the first four equilibria is (qpL, (1− q)pR), (qpL, (1− q)pR), ((1− q)pL, qpR), and ((1− q)pL, qpR) re-
spectively, since we are considering the green bargaining protocol and in all cases there is an extreme party
that possesses weak bargaining power, while the other extreme party possesses strong bargaining power. In
the last equilibrium, the policy outcome is pLR, as no extreme party can form a coalition with any of the
conventional parties.
Case I.4: 12 < q
In this case, from Equations (52)–(55) it follows that
B
2
+ VK(pE) <
B
2
+ V
1
2
K (pK , pKˆ) < q ·B + V qK(pK , pKˆ),
and
(1− q) ·B + V 1−qK (pK , pKˆ) <
B
2
+ V
1
2
K (pK , pKˆ).
Additionally, it also follows that
b+ VK(pLR) > (1− q) ·B + V 1−qK (pK , pKˆ).
With both bargaining protocols, it can be verified that the unique equilibrium is ({E1, E2}, {E1, E2}), which
leads to policy pLR.
Case II: qc ≤ 12 ≤ qn
All equilibrium policy outcomes for this case are summarized in Table 15:58
Case III: qn ≤ qc ≤ 12
All equilibrium policy outcomes for this case are summarized in Table 16:59
58A comprehensive proof of all cases can be provided by the authors upon request.
59As in Case II, a comprehensive proof of all cases can be provided by the authors upon request.
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0 < q < qc qc < q < 1
2
< qn < 1− q qc < q < 1
2
< 1− q < qn 1
2
< q < qn qn < q < 1
BP pE
pLR (×1)
pE (×1)
pLR (×1)
pE (×1)
pLR (×1)
pE (×1)
pLR
GP pE
pLR (×1)
pE (×1)
pLR (×1)
pE (×3)
pLR (×1)
pE (×3)
pLR
Table 15: Green versus blue protocol in the case of two extreme parties (Case II).
0 < q < qn qn < q < qc qc < q < 1
2
1
2
< q < 1
BP
(
1
2
pL,
1
2
pR
) (
1
2
pL,
1
2
pR
) (1
2
pL,
1
2
pR
)
(×2)
pLR (×1)
pLR
GP pE
(qpL, (1− q)pR) (×1)
((1− q)pL, qpR) (×1)
(qpL, (1− q)pR) (×2)
((1− q)pL, qpR) (×)
pLR (×1)
pLR
Table 16: Green versus blue protocol in the case of two extreme parties (Case III).
Finally, we focus on the case where the one-party exclusion rule applies. From Table 12 it immediately
follows that pLR cannot arise in equilibrium as it is not an outcome of the game. Tables 17–19 below show
the policies that arise in equilibrium when there are two extreme parties but the one-party exclusion rule
applies. A comprehensive proof can be provided by the authors upon request. To facilitate the comparison
between the two situations we subdivide the tables in the exactly same way as in the case with the one-party
exclusion rule.60
0 < q < qc qc < q < qn qn < q < 1
2
1
2
< q < 1
BP
(
1
2
pL,
1
2
pR
) (
1
2
pL,
1
2
pR
) (
1
2
pL,
1
2
pR
) (
1
2
pL,
1
2
pR
)
GP pE pE
(qpL, (1− q)pR) (×1)
((1− q)pL, qpR) (×1)
(
1
2
pL,
1
2
pR
)
Table 17: Green versus blue protocol in the case of two extreme parties with the one-party exclusion rule
(Case I: qc ≤ qn ≤ 12).
0 < q < qc qc < q < 1
2
< qn < 1− q qc < q < 1
2
< 1− q < qn 1
2
< q < qn qn < q < 1
BP pE pE pE pE pE
GP pE pE pE pE
(
1
2
pL,
1
2
pR
)
Table 18: Green versus blue protocol in the case of two extreme parties with the one-party exclusion rule
(Case II: qc ≤ 12 ≤ qn).
Next, we prove Proposition 3, where we analyze welfare in a framework with/without CPCs and two extreme
parties.
60The subdivision in the tables does not correspond to the cases necessary for the computation of equilibrium
outcomes. Either further subcases or fewer cases should be considered.
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0 < q < qn qn < q < qc qc < q < 1
2
1
2
< q < 1
BP
(
1
2
pL,
1
2
pR
) (
1
2
pL,
1
2
pR
) (
1
2
pL,
1
2
pR
) (
1
2
pL,
1
2
pR
)
GP pE
(qpL, (1− q)pR) (×1)
((1− q)pL, qpR) (×1)
(qpL, (1− q)pR) (×1)
((1− q)pL, qpR) (×1)
(
1
2
pL,
1
2
pR
)
Table 19: Green versus blue protocol in the case of two extreme parties with the one-party exclusion rule
(Case III: qn ≤ qc ≤ 12).
Proof of Proposition 3:
We prove each of the items sequentially. We stress that we are assuming that all equilibrium outcomes
are equally likely.61 We start with (a). Without CPCs and similarly to the case with only one extreme
party, it can be verified that the outcome is pE . Hence, if Condition (22) holds and all possible equilibrium
outcomes are equally likely, it follows from Tables 14-16 that CPCs are ex-ante welfare-improving under
both the green and the blue protocols. For instance, assume that qc ≤ qn ≤ 12 (see Table 14) and let WCPC
(or WCPC) denote welfare with CPCs (or without CPCs).62 Recall that H(·) denotes the cumulative
distribution function of q. In the case of the blue protocol we obtain
EH [WCPC ]− EH [WNCPC ]
=H(qc) ·
[
1
2
·W (pR) + 1
2
·W (pL)−W (pE)
]
+
(
H
(
1
2
)
−H(qc)
)
·
[
2
3
·
(
1
2
·W (pR) + 1
2
·W (pL)−W (pE)
)
+
1
3
· (W (pLR)−W (pE))
]
+
(
1−H
(
1
2
))
· [W (pLR)−W (pE)] > 0, (59)
where the inequality holds by Conditions (21) and (22). In the case of the blue protocol we similarly obtain
EH [WCPC ]− EH [WNCPC ]
=
H(qn)−H(qc)
2
· [W (pLR)−W (pE)]
+
(
H
(
1
2
)
−H(qn)
)[
4
5
·
(
1
2
·W (pR) + 1
2
·W (pL)−W (pE)
)
+
1
5
· (W (pLR)−W (pE))
]
+
(
1−H
(
1
2
))
· [W (pLR)−W (pE)] > 0, (60)
where the inequality again holds by Conditions (21) and (22). Second, part (b) holds because when B = 2b
and b −→ ∞, we have qn = qc −→ 12 . Then, from Equations (59) and (60) it straightforwardly follows
that ex-ante welfare with the blue protocol is higher than welfare with the green protocol if and only if
Condition (22) holds. Third, part (c) can be easily verified using Tables 14–16. Lastly, part (d) follows from
Condition (21) by comparing Tables 14, 15, and 16 with Tables 17, 18, and 19, respectively, if we assume
that W (·) is concave w.r.t. the policy in dimension T and conventional party positions are symmetric w.r.t.
pLR. The latter condition implies that
1
2W (pL) +
1
2W (pR) < W (pLR).
2
61The results hold under weaker assumptions about how society builds welfare with a multiplicity of equilibria.
62The other cases can be proved analogously to Case I (qc ≤ qn ≤ 12 ). A complete proof of Proposition 3 can be
provided by the authors upon request.
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